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ERASING BOUNDARIES: MASCULINITIES, SEXUAL
MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATIONt
Ann C. McGinley*
This Article analyzes the application of employment discrimination law to sexual
minorities-lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender and intersex individuals. It
evaluates Title VII and state anti-discrimination laws' treatment of these indi-
viduals, and is the first article to use masculinities research, theoretical and
empirical, to explain employment discrimination against sexual minorities.
While the Article concludes that new legislation would further the interests of sex-
ual minorities, it posits that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to solving the
employment discrimination problems of sexual minorities. A major problem lies in
the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a view that identifies men and women
as polar opposites, and that sees gender as naturally flowing from biological sex.
Without courts' understanding that our current binary concept of gender may be
socially constructed and artificially rigid rather than a natural result of biology,
even new legislation may fail to protect the workers it seeks to protect.
The Article demonstrates that research on masculinities can help courts better un-
derstand sexual minorities and the motivations of those who discriminate against
them in the workplace. It concludes that even in the absence of new legislation, a
proper interpretation of Title VII's sex discrimination provision would protect sex-
ual minorities from discrimination and would provide reasonable accommodation
to allow sexual minorities to live and work with dignity and security. With an
understanding of sexual minorities and the reasons why discrimination occurs,
Title VIi's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" should be sufficient to
grant sexual minorities workplace rights.
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University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 43:3
I. INTRODUCTION
Tide VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' protects against employ-
ment discrimination based on sex. The law is unsettled, however, as
it relates to sexual minorities. The statute does not explicitly pro-
tect individuals based on sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression.! In fact, federal courts have uniformly held that dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is not discrimination
based on sex and, therefore, is not prohibited by the federal act.
3
Moreover, all but one federal court to hear the issue have con-
cluded that discrimination because a person is transgender 4 is not
prohibited by the statute.5
But sexual minorities have made some progress toward protec-
tion against employment discrimination by using the Price
Waterhouse stereotyping doctrine to advance their cause. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins' held that it is illegal sex discrimination to
deny a masculine woman a promotion at the employer's firm be-
cause of her failure to adhere to stereotypes of appropriate
feminine behavior and dress. A number of courts have interpreted
Price Waterhouse to protect gay, lesbian or transgender workers
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
2. See id. "Gender identity" is the personal concept of whether a person is a man or a
woman. CLAUDINE GRIGGS, S/HE: CHANGING SEX AND CHANGING CLOTHES 69-70 (1998).
"Gender role" or "expression" is the public manifestation of a person's gender identity such
as behavior and dress. Shubo Ghosh & Leslie Walker, Sexuality: Gender Identity, EMEDICINE,
May 19, 2009, http://www.emedicine.com/ped/TOPIC2789.htm (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). As used here, the term "sexual orientation" refers to
the orientation that a person has with respect to sexual pleasure, which is defined by the
object of the individual's sexual attention: homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual or other.
3. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
4. "Transgender" or "transgendered" is the umbrella term used to describe persons
whose gender identity and/or expression differ from those expected of persons of their
biological sex. See American Psychological Ass'n, Answers to Your Questions About Trans-
gender Individuals and Gender Identity, http://apa.org/topics/transgender.html (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Transsexuals are transgender per-
sons who live and/or work in a gender other than that assigned to them at birth. They often
accomplish this endeavor by taking hormones and having sex reassignment surgery and/or
other surgeries such as facial feminizing surgery for men transitioning to women, and chest
reconstruction for women transitioning to men. Id.; see also Kristen Schilt & Matthew
Wiswall, Before and After Gender Transitions, Human Capital, and Workplace Experiences, 8 B.E. J.
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y,Jan. 2008, at 6.
5. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that dis-
crimination based on transgender status is not illegal sex discrimination under Title VII);
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). But see Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination against an indi-
vidual because he or she is transgender).
6. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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where the discrimination occurs because of the individual's failure
to conform to prescribed gender norms and stereotypes. Courts
have not uniformly accepted this interpretation, however, and even
courts that accept the doctrine often hold that it does not protect
individual litigants before them.8 Courts have drawn boundaries in
various ways, often avoiding protection for sexual minorities. These
boundaries include barriers between discrimination based on sex-
ual stereotyping (which is sex discrimination) and discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity (which is not). Even
in response to motions for summary judgment, courts distinguish
between harassing behaviors that are motivated by sex stereotyping
and those that are motivated by sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity. Determining motivation in such a complex area as gender is
artificial and unconvincing, especially without a full record and
expert testimony.
Because of the uneven protection of sexual minorities from em-
ployment discrimination, advocates for sexual minorities have
lobbied Congress for years either to amend Title VII or to pass a
new law to protect against employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity. While a number of bills
have been introduced in the House and the Senate, to date, none
of these bills has passed both houses of Congress. Currently, there
are bills before both the House of Representatives and the Senate.9
These bills create the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009
(ENDA). Even if Congress enacts one of these bills, there remains
a question as to whether courts will interpret it to give broad pro-
tection to sexual minorities in the workplace.
The problem of adequately protecting sexual minorities under
Title VII lies in the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a view
that identifies men and women as polar opposites and that sees
gender as naturally flowing from biological sex. Without under-
standing that our current binary concept of gender may be socially
constructed and artificially rigid rather than a natural result of bi-
ology, the law, even if it explicitly protects persons based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, may fail to shelter from discrimi-
nation those workers it seeks to protect. Gender scholars and, in
particular, masculinities scholars can help courts understand why
the boundary-drawing is based on a misunderstanding of sexual
minorities.
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. See infra notes 150,152, 273-296 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 12, 94-103 and accompanying text.
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This Article discusses how workplace discrimination law applies
to the different groups of individuals who do not fit within binary
conceptions of gender or sex-lesbians, gays, bisexuals, trans-
gender and intersex ° individuals. It analyzes Title VII and state
anti-discrimination laws' treatment of these individuals at work,
and uses masculinities and other gender research to provide a
theoretical account that explains, at least in part, discrimination
against members of these groups. Finally, the Article proposes that
the best solution is to pass a federal statute or amendment to Title
VII that would protect individuals from discrimination based on
sexual orientation, intersex condition, gender identity and expres-
sion, and that would provide reasonable accommodations to
transgender and intersex individuals for access to appropriate rest-
room and locker facilities at work. Even without passage of a
federal act, however, this Article concludes that courts should in-
terpret the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII and its state
counterparts, with the aid of masculinities and other social science
research, to protect persons from discrimination at work based on
sexual orientation, intersex condition, gender identity or expres-
sion.
Masculinities research demonstrates that much harassing behav-
ior directed at gays and transsexuals occurs because of sex or
gender, and is therefore prohibited by Title VII. It occurs because
of the sex or gender of the harasser and of the victim. The harasser
is motivated to harass in order to negotiate his masculinity in the
workplace and to prove that the job in question is masculine. The
victim is harassed because he or she (in the case of a Male-to-
Female transsexual) is perceived to be insufficiently masculine to
continue in the job.
Part II of the Article analyzes the gender and masculinities re-
search that challenges our binary concept of gender. Part III
examines the federal and state case law dealing with employment
10. Intersex individuals are persons born with indeterminate sex because their chro-
mosomes do not match their genitalia, or their genitalia is ambiguous, or they carry an extra
chromosome or a mosaic chromosomal pattern. CATHERINE HARPER, INTERSEX 9-12
(2007); Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not Enough, THE ScI-
ENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20, 22. The American Academy of Pediatrics has recommended
that the terms "intersex," "hermaphrodite" and "pseudohermaphrodite" be replaced be-
cause they are considered pejorative. The Academy recommends the term "disorders of sex
development" (DSD). See Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex
Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488, e488 (2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/118/2/e488. Be-
cause "intersex" continues to be used commonly in non-derogatory %ys and the term
"DSD" has not acquired much of a following, I use both terms in this Article.
[VOL. 43:3
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discrimination against sexual minorities (LGBT individuals)' and
reveals the underlying assumptions supporting much of the analy-
sis. Part IV demonstrates how theoretical understandings of
masculinities theory would inform courts and Congress about the
nature of gender. This better understanding should lead to the
passage of federal legislative protections, and even in the absence
of federal legislation, better judicial interpretations. Finally, the
Article concludes that courts should look to masculinities research
in applying Title VII and state discrimination laws (and ENDA
2009," if it passes) to sexual minorities. Only with an understand-
ing of this research will courts recognize that discrimination
against sexual minorities is always "because of sex" and sexual mi-
norities should be protected by current law, with or without
passage of ENDA 2009, in a manner that gives them full rights in
the workplace.
II. BACKGROUND: GENDER AS A BINARY: FEMINISM,
QUEER THEORY AND MASCULINITIES THEORY
A. Feminist Accounts of Gender
Popular culture perceives gender as a fixed phenomenon that
derives naturally from an individual's biological sex. It assumes that
persons categorized as female biologically should be, and naturally
are, feminine and attracted to men, and that persons categorized
as male biologically should be, and naturally are, masculine and
attracted to women. According to popular culture, gender is a
means of promoting reproduction; gender relates to biological sex
as "feminine" relates to female and "masculine" relates to male.
Many of these perceptions are unconscious or hidden because they
seem natural.
Sociologists and feminist scholars argue that gender is socially
constructed, 3 that gender role or expression is not natural but
11. "LGBT" stands for "lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals." At times it is written
as "LGBTI" to include intersex individuals or "LGBTQ" to include queer individuals. While I
use "LGBT" throughout the Article because it is more common, I do not intend to exclude
intersex or queer individuals.
12. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); S.
1584, 111th Cong. (2009).
13. See, e.g.,Judith Lorber, Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality,
and Gender, 66 Soc. INQUIRY 143, 146-47 (1996) (staing that gender is "a social institution
that establishes patterns of expectations for individuals, orders the social processes of every-
day life, is built into the major social organizations of society, such as the economy, ideology,
the family, and politics, and is also an entity in and of itself.").
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learned behavior. It is a performance that is contestable or
changeable. The popular binary view exaggerates differences be-
tween men and women and disregards similarities. 14 It does not
take into account biological variety, individual difference, diverse
sexual orientation and the role that society plays in constructing
biology, 5 gender and sexual orientation. It converts persons who
do not fit into the binary into unnatural outcasts. These outcasts
include, among others, feminine men, masculine women, gays,
lesbians, bisexuals,' 6 transgender, transsexual, intersex and gender
queer individuals.17 While biology clearly plays an important role in
behavior, the history of the American medical profession in con-
structing gender by attempting to force individuals to conform to
gender norms and roles demonstrates the importance of social
construction of gender.
8
B. Sexual Orientation and Heteronormativity: Queer Theory
A binary conception of gender also leads to the inevitable con-
clusion that heterosexuality is normal and that homosexuality is
abnormal. Queer theorists argue that heterosexuality as "the
norm" is socially constructed.
14. See, e.g., R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 231-34 (2d ed. 2005); JUDITH LORBER,
PARADOXES OF GENDER 294-302 (1994); Lorber, supra note 13, at 144-45 (arguing that
adopting binary concepts reinforces the view of normal and deviant); Judith Lorber, Using
Genderto Undo Gender: A Feminist Degendering Movement, 1 FEMINIST THEORY 79,83 (2000).
15. Society constructs biology by deciding which sex a child who is born with ambigu-
ous sexuality will be raised and by subjecting the child to surgery to attempt to make the
child's body align with the chosen sex. See Alice Domurat Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"-or
Ambivalent Medicine?: Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 1998, at 24, 27; see also Meghan Daum, The Case of Caster Semenya, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2009, at A27 (describing the controversy over the South African runner who won an
international race in Berlin as a woman, but who was later found to be intersex).
16. Defining "bisexual" may be more complicated than originally one would think. See
infra Part IIl.C.2.
17. "Gender queer" individuals are persons who feel needlessly constrained by the
sex/gender binary. This term can include gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgender indi-
viduals and even heterosexuals who find sex/gender constricting. Queer individuals can be
part of a queer social movement if they are willing to accept the term and to identify as
queer and to recognize their own privilege vis-a-vis others. See Coralee Drechsler, We Are All
Others: An Argument for Queer, in BISEXUALITY AND TRANSGENDERISM: INTERSEXIONS OF THE
OTHERS 265, 273-74 (Jonathan Alexander & Karen Yescavage eds., 2003). "Queer," then, is
more of a political movement than a sexual or gender identity.
18. See, e.g., JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, How SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUAL-
ITY IN THE UNITED STATES 125-26 (2002) (describing leading doctors in the 1960s who
established gender identity programs that taught parents how to establish and reinforce
gender roles for their children, including attempts to get "sissy" boys to act more masculine
and "tomboy" girls to act more feminine).
[VOL. 43:3
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Queer theory, which derives from cultural studies, comprises
four different concepts: (1) that sexuality is central to the struggle
for political power whether it is obvious or not; (2) that identity is
performative, not natural; (3) that political struggle is an ironic
parody rather than a true struggle for liberation; and (4) that
popular culture may offer a window into the struggle for political
power that may actually prove to be transformative. 9
Queer theorists argue that power and political meaning are cre-
ated through binaries that "are inflected with sex., 20 These binaries
include heterosexual/homosexual, reason/desire, man/woman.
21
The binary terms, however, are not equal. While one depends on
the other for its meaning, the first is cast as acceptable and good
and the second is of questionable legitimacy. Queer theory distin-
guishes itself from other postmodern theories by asserting that
every binary is inflected with sex, even those that appear to have
nothing to do with sexuality.22 Persons who are associated with the
questionable term tend to closet themselves while those associated
with the acceptable term may "out" them. An example of this dy-
namic is the insecure heterosexual who engages in "gay bashing" in
order to secure his or her superior position as heterosexual.
Thus, according to queer theory, heterosexuality needs homosexu-
ality in order to establish heterosexual identity as "non-
homosexual" and to maintain a superior position. While LGBT
groups have encouraged coming out of the closet as a means of
communicating one's true identity, many queer theorists are skep-
tical, arguing that sexuality is not fixed, but elusive and changing,
and that coming out permits heterosexuality to use homosexuality
as a foil so that heterosexuals may maintain a dominant position. 4
Queer theorists claim that identity is fluid and is therefore per-
formative. They differ from the gay identity approach that sees
some people as homosexual and others as heterosexual. Gay iden-
tity is receptive to the idea that sexuality has biological roots.25
Queer theorists argue instead that identity is not fixed or natural,
but relational and learned-it depends on the interaction with
others.26 They conclude that lesbian and gay identities, even
though they are constructed on the ideal of equality, actually
19. See Susan Burgess, Queer (Theory) Eye for the Straight (Legal) Guy. Lawrence v. Texas'
Makeover ofBowers v. Hardwick, 59 POL. REs. Q. 401,402-05 (2006).
20. Id. at 403.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 113 (2006).
26. See Burgess, supra note 19, at 403.
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exclude others, such as transgender persons, as outsiders.27 Queer
theorists use parody and irony as strategies to comment on gender
and sex. For example, they see drag queens as offering an exagger-
ated and humorous parody on sex and gender. Such drag
performances may "destabilize well-worn, yet firmly entrenched
discourses, such as identity discussions that are a product of the
heterosexual/homosexual binary."
28
C. Masculinities Theory and Gender
Developed primarily by sociologists to understand men and
masculinity, masculinities studies also draw from psychology,
criminology, feminist theory, queer theory, anthropology and ge-
ography. Most masculinities theorists accept that gender is socially
constructed, but there are variations among masculinities experts
in their view of the importance of the body, and in whether biology
plays any role in establishing norms of behavior. R.W. Connell, a
leading theorist in masculinities, for example, sees gender as an
ordering of social practice based on reproductive capacity rather
than on biology.30 Connell believes that gender exists to fill in the
gaps left by biology.3' But she disagrees with those social construc-
tionists who see the body as merely a "landscape" on which to draw
or a perspective from which one speaks. Instead, she argues that
while gender is socially constructed and not biologically predeter-
mined, our bodies play a role in this material construction.33
Masculinities researchers consider how societal norms shape be-
havior of individual men and women, how masculinities are
imbedded in the structure of institutions, and how individuals and
groups perform masculinities within those institutions. The term
"masculinities" has multiple meanings. For purposes of this Article,
it refers to the construction of masculine identities at work through
performance, and a set of practices and the active engagement in
these practices by men or women at work. These practices, con-
sciously or unconsciously, reinforce the gender hierarchy in
workplaces by conflating "doing masculinity" with work itself.
27. See Drechsler, supra note 17, at 273.
28. Burgess, supra note 19, at 404.
29. See Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Wis. J.L. GENDER &
Soc'v 201,211-21 (2008).
30. See, e.g., CONNELL, supra note 14, at 71-72.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 50-52.
33. Id.
[VOL. 43:3
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1. The Construction of Masculine Identities
Through Performance
Masculinities are plural. There are multiple forms of masculinity
that are affected by time, place, social class, race, gender, sexual
orientation, age, disability and national origin. Thus, masculinities
theorists prefer the term "masculinities" to "masculinity." More-
over, masculinities are not static, but active and changeable. 4
The normative masculinity in the American workplace includes
aggression, competition, and anxiety.35 Although numerous mascu-
linities exist in tension with one another, the powerful hegemonic
masculinity is white, middle class, and heterosexual. 6 Masculinities
researchers posit that our culture rewards white middle-class men
who compete to prove their masculinity, exclude women from
power because they lack masculinity, and exclude men from power
who do not live up to the normative definition of masculinity.
7
Masculinity as anti-femininity "lies at the heart of contemporary
and historical conceptions of manhood, so that masculinity is de-
fined more by what one is not rather than who one is.3
Masculinity involves a flight from the feminine, and a fear of ho-
mosexuality. Men engage in "homosocial events" to gain
acceptance by testing themselves in order to prove to other men
that they are masculine.39 This is a dangerous experience for the
men, full of risk and relentless competition.40 The pressure to
prove one's masculinity is constant and the competition is keen.
Masculinity is fragile. Men compete to prove that they are mas-
culine because without masculinity, they are empty vessels. But the
vast majority of men can not achieve the ideal hegemonic form of
masculinity. As they fall short, they suffer and often cause others
who are subordinated to them to suffer as well in order to capture
whatever masculinity they can.4 1
34. See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Con-
struction of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 182, 183-84 (Peter F. Murphy
ed., 2004).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 184.
37. Id. at 184-85.
38. Id. at 185. As Kenneth Karst states, "[t]he main demands for positive achievement
of masculinity arise outside the home, and those demands reinforce the boy's need to be
what his mother is not. In the hierarchical and rigorously competitive society of other boys,
one categorical imperative outranks all the others: don't be a girl." Kenneth L. Karst, The
Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 503 (1991).
39. Kimmel, supra note 34, at 186-87.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 184-87.
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Many who perform masculinities see homosexuality as feminine
behavior; homophobia "is a central organizing principle of our cul-
tural definition of manhood. Homophobia is more than the
irrational fear of gay men, more than the fear that we might be
perceived as gay.''42 It is a fear that other men will recognize that
men are not as masculine as they pretend to be. 3 This fear creates
shame and leads to an unwillingness to stand up for others who are
harassed.44 Moreover, it compels men to enact exaggerated mascu-
line behaviors and to project attitudes that women and gays are
"the other" with whom men compare themselves in order to estab-
lish their own "manhood.,
45
Hegemonic masculinity is the powerful masculinity in a particu-
lar place at a particular time. It is the "configuration of gender
practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees ... the
dominant position of men and the subordination of women. 46
Subordinated masculinities are forms of masculinity performed by
those who do not have the power to perform hegemonic masculin-
ities because of their position in society. Often the response of the
subordinated masculinities is subversive in that it resists the hege-
monic form of masculinity and presents a different, often more
forceful or violent form of masculinity. Social scientists have stud-
ied the performance of masculinities in workplace environments
that are all male or predominantly male.4' They observe that even
in the absence of women workers, men enact masculinities in rela-
tionship to one another. That is, they engage in competitive ritual
behaviors such as sexual humor, aggressive derogatory comments
and physical touching and grabbing of other men's genitals. 4 The
men compete aggressively by engaging in these behaviors in order
to prove their masculinity to one another.
Men use humor to build a sense of solidarity, to break the mo-
notony of their jobs, and to resist the tight control exercised over
them by the managers.9 In a study of the relationship between
humor and masculinity in blue collar shops in England, the men
working on the shop floor developed a "shared sense of masculin-
ity" by adopting exaggerated nicknames for each other and by
42. Id. at 188.
43. Id. at 189.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 191.
46. CONNELL, supra note 14, at 77.
47. See, e.g., David L. Collinson, 'Engineering Humor Masculinity, Joking and Conflict in
Shop-floor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181 (1988).
48. Id. at 185-86, 189.
49. Id.
[VOL. 43:3
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using hyper-masculine banter on the shop floor, "permeated by
uninhibited swearing, mutual ridicule, [and] displays of sexuality
and 'pranks."' 50 By contrasting their own hyper-masculinity with
what they characterized as effeminate behavior of management,
the men actively resisted their subordination by management:5
Their resistance was couched in explicit gender terms. They char-
acterized management as effeminate: "twats" and "nancy boys."
52
This humor gave them a sense of power and authority at work,
permitting them to "negate and distance' 53 their managers, even
though the shop jobs required monotonous, repetitious tasks.
Their use of humor also allowed the men to exercise pressure on
the group to conform to working-class masculinity.
Collinson observes, however, that many of the men admitted to
him that they did not act this way at home. 4 Indeed, their behavior
at work was a performance that established their identities as mas-
culine men, a performance that was necessary to survive the work
environment. The gendered behavior did not exist outside of the
workplace; rather, the men's gender identities were socially en-
acted at work through their performances and their interactions
with one another. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati explain that the
performance of identities helps outsiders become more acceptable
in the workplace, but may become a denial of oneself.55 While men
perform masculinities in the shop context to resist supervisors' au-
thority, these behaviors also appear to be identity performances to
gain acceptance.
Women, effeminate men and transgender individuals may be
harassed to undermine their competence, to force them out of the
job, and to preserve the job as a masculine enclave. Men also di-
rect this behavior at newcomers and even at those who have been
in the workplace for a period in order to assure that they conform
to the group's masculine norms and that they perform the behav-
iors that reinforce the norms. 7 These behaviors assure the job's
masculine identity, and the masculine identity of those holding the
jobs. These performances often involve harassment directed at the
50. Id. at 185-86.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 186.
53. See id. at 186.
54. See id. at 192.
55. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259
(2000) (describing how outsider employees perform their identities in the workplace).
56. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1762-69
(1998).
57. Id.; cf. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX, BROTHERHOOD, AND
PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS 166-79 (2d ed. 2007) (describing hazing in college fraternities).
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outsider who can not or will not perform masculinity in an accept-
able manner. Common targets are effeminate men, gay men, and
transgender individuals. The harassment of these individuals oc-
curs because of sex or gender because the harasser uses the victim,
who displays a less fulsome masculinity, as a means of proving his
own masculinity.
2. Masculinities: Practices at Work
Besides constructing identity through performance, the term
"masculiniies" as used here refers to practices. These practices be-
come so conflated with work and success at work that they are
often invisible to those who practice them. Moreover, because of
their association with the norm at work, both women and men can
engage in these behaviors. These practices vary depending on the
type of workplace, but their dominant characteristic is that they
often affect men and women differently in the workplace.
a. White Collar Masculinities
Collinson and Hearn identified five types of masculinities prac-
ticed in white collar workplaces. They include authoritarianism,
paternalism, entrepreneurialism, informalism and careerism.
5
8
Managers who practice authoritarianism broach no dissent or dif-
ference, are unwilling to engage in dialogue, and prefer coercive
power and control over subordinates. Paternalism is enacted by
managers who model themselves on the father in a family.60 They
emphasize personal trust and loyalty. The effect is to ensure the
subordinate's cooperation and to enhance the manager's power.
Entrepreneurialism is a highly competitive style that elevates effi-
ciency and managerial control over other values.61 It requires
subordinates to work long hours, to be mobile geographically, and
to meet tight deadlines. Informalism is a method of building rela-
tionships based on shared interests.2 Talk about women, sex, and
baseball builds relationships between men while screening out fe-
male colleagues. Careerism is a masculinity enacted by middle-class
58. David Collinson &Jeff Hearn, Naming Men as Men: Implications for Work, Organiza-
tion and Management, 1 GENDER WORK & ORG. 2, 13-16 (1994).
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id. at 13-14.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 14-15.
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white managers whose masculine identity is linked to hard work
63
and upward movement in their careers.
b. Blatant Masculinities
In more blatant forms, masculinities may include physical and
verbal abuse of females in predominately male workplaces, of male
victims who are homosexual or otherwise do not conform to mas-
culine stereotypes, and of transgender individuals. The victims are
harmed because of their gender. Women suffer severe hostility and
sexual harassment when they are the objects of the behavior. The
harm to gender non-conforming men is obvious: they are pushed,
prodded, threatened, ridiculed and even raped at work. Male to
female transsexuals are particularly vulnerable to these behaviors
because they threaten the masculinity of the group and of the work
itself. Men trying to prove their masculinity degrade victims
through taunts and practices that compare the male victims to
women or that ascribe traits to the victims that are considered
"feminine." By openly abusing men who do not conform to gender
stereotypes, men police the social and gender order at work, rein-
forcing the definition of certain jobs as "masculine" and closed to
non-conforming men and most women. Finally, the abusive behav-
ior toward gender non-conforming men reinforces the gendered
institution of work, an institution that privileges heterosexual white
men over women, homosexual men, and transsexuals.
3. Applications of Masculinities Studies to Title VII
While masculinities theory shares many premises with feminist
theory and draws much of its analysis from feminism, masculinities
theory attempts to demonstrate why a reverence for the hegemonic
forms of masculinity harms men as well as women.64 It acknowl-
edges that men as a group are powerful, but also claims that
individual men often feel powerless. 5 These feelings of powerless-
ness derive from pressure on men to act as breadwinners, to
63. Id. at 15-16.
64. See Peter F. Murphy, Introduction to FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 1, 9-10 (Peter F.
Murphy ed., 2004); Joseph H. Pleck, Men's Power with Women, Other Men, and Society: A Men's
Movement Analysis, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES, supra this note, at 57, 57-60, 67.
65. See Kimmel, supra note 34, at 194-95.
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compete with other men to demonstrate their masculinity, and to
deny their emotions.66
Masculinities studies combine with other social science research
to uncover hidden gendered expectations and biases, to interpret
cultural meanings, and to provide new interpretations of the law.
Combined with other research on gender, masculinities studies
offers a better understanding of the way men and women behave
and of the culture's interpretations of that behavior.
While masculinities studies is not a comprehensive theory for
understanding human behavior, it offers explanations that other
theories do not. First, by focusing on men's behaviors and motiva-
tions as well as the structures that benefit men, masculinities
studies help us understand men and power, and the importance of
recognizing that although individual men might benefit from the
patriarchal dividend,67 they may not be entirely powerful in their
daily lives. This is because men are not all situated in similarly
powerful positions vis-,-vis one another. A focus on men helps us
understand that men are unequally positioned because of race,
national origin, class, and even appearance and height. Inequali-
ties result from these other identity factors as they intersect with
gender. Perhaps even more crucial, masculinities studies help ex-
plain that workplace structures are themselves masculine and that
masculine structures and behaviors are conflated with work.
Women, transgender individuals, gay men and men of color who
attempt to assimilate into the masculine workplace will have to
work harder because their lived experiences are different from
those of straight white men. Despite these efforts, often these indi-
viduals fail because they do not conform to gender expectations
and are therefore subject to discrimination and harassment at
work.
III. THE LAW OF SEXUAL MINORITIES AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Background: Political and Identity Issues in the LGBT Community
Generally, Title VII law has not protected lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, intersex, and queer individuals from discrimination
based on their failure to fit neatly into the binary concepts of male
and female. The binary concept of male and female, masculine
66. See id.; Pleck, supra note 64, at 59-60.
67. The "patriarchal dividend" is the "advantage men in general gain from the overall
subordination of women." CONNELL, supra note 14, at 79.
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and feminine, gives rise to heteronormativity, the conclusion that
heterosexual relations between women and men are natural and
that homosexual behavior is unnatural. While heteronormativity
prevails, society's opinion of homosexuality has changed signifi-
cantly over the past twenty-five years. Homosexuality was listed as a
mental disorder until 1973 in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, in 1973, the American Psychiatric Association re-
versed course and concluded that homosexuality is not a mental
disorder.6 8 Today, although still controversial, many consider ho-
mosexuality to be an identity, rather than an illness or deviant
behavior, and a number of state laws protect civil unions between
gays or gay marriage.69 Nonetheless, lesbians and gays continue to
suffer discrimination in workplaces, and recognition of gay rela-
tionships may exclude other sexual minorities by reinforcing a new
binary concept of heterosexuality versus homosexuality.
Even with the increasing acceptance of homosexual identity and
relationships, this newly expanded binary presumes that persons
are either male or female and that they fit into one of two catego-
ries of sexual orientation: heterosexual or homosexual. This
presumption does not track reality. Other groups experiencing
discrimination because their gender identities or expressions do
not comport with binary definitions include bisexual, transgender
and transsexual, intersex and queer individuals. While there has
been considerable scholarship on gay and lesbian rights, legal
scholars have just recently begun to grapple with the treatment of
transgender and intersex individuals.70 There is to date no pub-
lished legal scholarship on bisexuals in the workplace.
68. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 302 (2d ed. 1974); see also Richard D. Lyons, Psychiatrists, in a Shift, Declare Homo-
sexuality No Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1.
69. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions,
and Domestic Partnerships, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices/
SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
70. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective
Condemnation of "Cultural Practices", 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 71, 77-79 (2005) (comparing
surgery on intersex infants in the United States with female circumcisions performed in
African nations); Julie A. Greenberg, Intersex and Intrasex Debates: Building Alliances to Chal-
lenge Sex Discrimination, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 99, 103-07 (2005) (describing the
debates between the intersex community and other members of the LGBT community);
Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and
Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999) (arguing that the law should permit self-identification of
sexual minorities); L. Camille Hebert, Transforming Transsexual and Transgender Rights, 15
WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 535 (2009) (concluding that courts should treat discrimination
against transgender persons as discrimination because of sex under Title VII); Katie Koch &
Richard Bales, Transgender Employment Discrimination, 17 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 243 (2008)
(same); Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 205, 239-42
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B. Congressional Attempts to Ban Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity Discrimination
Title VII prohibits discrimination against employees and appli-
cants based on sex, but does not expressly protect employees and
applicants from discrimination based on sexual orientation, gen-
der identity or gender expression. 7' Twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia protect against discrimination in employment
based on sexual orientation,72 and a number of municipalities and
counties have enacted similar laws. 73 Of the twenty-four states and
the District of Columbia, sixteen jurisdictions prohibit discrimina-
tion based on gender identity as well. 4 A few of the states that
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity limit the prohibition to state employment or to a particular
(2009); Zachary A. Kramer, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Title VII's Intersexions, 7 GEO.J. GEN-
DER & L. 31 (2006) (discussing the courts' distortion of issues confronting sexual minorities
though categorization).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
72. Alaska, Admin. Order No. 195 (2002); California, CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12920-
12922, 12926(q) (West 2005); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 to -402 (2008);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2008); Delaware, Del. Exec. Order No.
10, 4 Del. Reg. Regs. 1562 (March 1, 2001); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11
(2009); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); Illinois, 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/1-102, 5/2-102 (2008); Indiana, Dept. Child Servs., Policy No. HR-2-5 (2005);
Iowa, IowA CODE § 216.6(1) (2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4572 (2009); Mary-
land, MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 16 (LexisNexis 2003); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
151B, § 4 (2009); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2009); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 613.330 (2006); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (2009); NewJersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 to -12 (West Supp. 2009); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7 (Supp.
2007); NewYork, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney Supp. 2009); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.006 (2008); Pennsylvania, Exec. Order No. 2003-10 (2003); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-5-3 to 28-5-7 (2003); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (2003), Washington,
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 2008); Wisconsin, Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.321.36
(2008).
73. E.g., COLUMBUS, OHIO, ORDINANCE tit. 23, § 2331.03 (1959); COOK COUNTY, ILL.,
ORDINANCE §§ 42-31, 42-35 (2006); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE tit. 7, § 139.40
(1976); PITTSBURGH, PA., ORDINANCE § 659.02 (2006); SAN DIEGO, CAL., ORDINANCE ch. 5,
art. 2, div. 96, § 52.9603 (2003); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE § 14.04.020-04.040 (1980).
74. California, CAL. Gov. CODE § 12926 (West 2005); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 24-34-401 to -402 (2008); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2008);
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2009); Illinois, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102,
5/2-102 (2008); Indiana, Dept. Child Servs. Policy No. HR-2-5 (2005); Iowa, IOWA CODE
§ 216.6 (1)(2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2009); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 363A.08 (2009); NewJersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 to -12 (West Supp. 2009); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7 (Supp. 2007); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.006 (2008);
Pennsylvania, Exec. Order No. 2003-10 (2003); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-3 to 28-
5-7 (2003); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (2003), Washington, WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 2008).
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agency in state employment. 75 Without federal protection, these
local and state laws create an uneven patchwork of protection
against discrimination.76
The federal Americans with Disabilities Act expressly excludes
persons based on their sexual orientation and transgender status
from the definition of disability.7  A few state disability statutes,
however, have been interpreted to protect transgender individuals
78as persons with disabilities. This protection, however, is sparse and
uneven.
Over the past thirty-four years, the United States Congress has
considered many bills that would prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation. v In 1975, Bella Abzug introduced in the United
States House of Representatives the first bill to amend Title VII to
expressly protect employees and applicants from discrimination
based on their sexual orientation. s° Since that date, numerous bills
have been introduced in the House of Representatives and the
United States Senate to protect persons from sexual orientation dis-
crimination. While at least one of these bills came close to passing in
the United States Senate, none of them has passed. Representative
Barney Frank introduced the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 2007 (ENDA) 8' in the House of Representatives.82 In its original
form, ENDA protected against discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation, actual or perceived, and gender identity, actual or
perceived.83 The gender identity provision also required that the
employer provide reasonable shower and locker room accommoda-
tions to transgender persons.84 The hearing on H.R. 2015 elicited
significant opposition from religious and employer's groups. 5 These
75. See, e.g., Alaska, Admin. Order No. 195 (2002) (sexual orientation only); Indiana,
Dept. Child Servs. Policy No. HR-2-5 (2005) (sexual orientation and gender identity); Penn-
sylvania, Exec. Order No. 2003-10 (2003) (sexual orientation and gender identity).
76. H.R. REp. No. 110-406, at 20-21, 23 (2007); seealsoHebert, supra note 70, at 541-43.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12211 (2006).
78. See, e.g., Doe v. Electro-Craft Corp., No. 87-E-132, 1988 WL 1091932 (N.H. Super.
Ct. April 8, 1988); Enriquez v. W.Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001). But see Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993) (holding that plaintiff's gender
dysphoria was not a handicap under state law because there was no proof that the employer
discriminated because of her gender dysphoria, but implying that if proof of causation ex-
isted, gender dysphoria would be protected by the disability statute).
79. See generally H.R. REP. No. 110-406 (2007).
80. Id. at 2.
81. H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007).
82. H.R. RaP. No. 110-406, at 2-8 (2007).
83. H.R. 2015 § 4.
84. Id. § 8 (a) (3).
85. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007: Hearing on HR. 2015 Before the Subcomm. on
Health, Employment, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education & Labor, 110th Cong. 42-47
(2007) (statement of Mark Fahleson, Adjunct Professor of Employment Law, University of
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groups were most concerned with the narrow exemption for reli-
gious organizations and what they considered to be the vagueness of
the definition and protection based on gender identity.86 Opponents
also objected because they believed that a provision in the statute
that permitted an employer to require reasonable dress codes could
not co-exist with the protections of gender identity.8 7 In order to pass
the bill, its proponents agreed to a compromise that protects indi-
viduals based on sexual orientation, actual or perceived, and that
gives broad exemptions to religious organizations, but does not ex-
pressly protect individuals based on gender identitym Consequently,
the compromise also eliminated the employer's duty to provide rea-
sonable accommodations to an individual's gender identity. The
amended bill, H.R. 3685, which defined the term "sexual orientation"
to mean "homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality,"89 passed the
House of Representatives on November 7, 2007 and was placed on
the Senate calendar.9° There was no Senate action on the bill.
The bill tracked much of the language of Title VII, but it would
have created a separate law making it illegal to discriminate against
employees and applicants based on their sexual orientation or per-
ceived sexual orientation. Moreover, while it permitted employees
to bring disparate treatment claims for damages if there is proof
that the employer intentionally violated the Act, it did not provide
for a cause of action if an employer's neutral policies and practices
created a disparate impact on gay men, lesbians and bisexuals.9'
Finally, it explicitly stated that it did not "invalidate or limit the
rights, remedies, or procedures available to an individual claiming
discrimination under any other Federal law or regulation or any
law or regulation of a State or political subdivision of a State. 92
This section confirmed that Congress did not intend to overrule
Nebraska College of Law); id. at 56 (letter from the General Conference of Seventh Day Ad-
ventists, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, and the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 36-39 (2007) (statement of Lawrence Lorber, Partner, Proskauer Rose
LLP).
88. See H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007) (protecting gender identity); H.R. 3685, 110th
Cong. (2007) (protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation, actual or per-
ceived, but not referring to gender identity).
89. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (8) (2007).
90. 153 Cong. Rec. H13227 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (vote on H.R. 3685, 110th Cong.
(2007)).
91. H.R. REP. No. 110-406, at 10 (2007). This contrasts with at least one state statute
that has been interpreted to grant a disparate impact cause of action based on sexual orien-
tation. See Taylor v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 21 Misc.3d 23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (noting that
New York law grants a disparate impact cause of action).
92. H.R. 3685 § 15.
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the portion of the opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that has
been interpreted by lower courts to protect individuals, including
lesbians and gays and transgender persons, from discrimination for
their failure to conform to sex or gender stereotypes.93
In June and August 2009, members of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate introduced identical bills entitled the
"Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009.", 4 These bills pro-
hibit discrimination against individuals in employment based on
perceived or actual sexual orientation and gender identity, and re-
taliation against them based on their opposition to employment
practices made unlawful by the act.95 They also make it unlawful to
discriminate against an applicant or employee based on the actual
or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of a person with
whom he or she associates.96
"Sexual orientation" is defined as including homosexuality, het-
erosexuality or bisexuality.9' "Gender identity" is defined as "the
gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gen-
der-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard
to the individual's designated sex at birth."98
The new bills, like Title VII, grant a cause of action for disparate
treatment, but unlike Title VII, do not provide a cause of action for
disparate impact.99 The bills specify that it is not a violation based on
actual or perceived gender identity to deny access to shared shower
or dressing facilities in which being seen unclothed is unavoidable.""
However, to take advantage of this provision, the employer must
provide reasonable access to facilities that are not inconsistent with
the individual's gender identity at the time of employment or upon
notice to the employer that the person is undergoing or has under-
gone gender transition. 1°' The bill also states that employers may
impose reasonable dress codes during work hours provided that the
employer permits the employee undergoing or who has undergone
a gender transition to comply with the dress code pertinent to the
gender to which the person has transitioned or is transitioning.' 2
93. H.R. REP. No. 110-406, at 21. For a discussion of the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyp-
ing theory and the courts' application of it to lesbians, gays and transsexuals, see infra Parts
III.C.1, III.C.3.
94. H.R. 3017, 111 th Cong. (2009); S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009).
95. H.R. 3017 §§ 4-5; S. 1584 §§ 4-5.
96. H.R. 3017 § 4(e); S. 1584 § 4(e).
97. H.R. 3017 § 3(a) (9); S. 1584 § 3(a) (9).
98. H.R. 3017 § 3(a) (6); S. 1584 § 3(a) (6).
99. H.R. 3017 § 4(g); S. 1584 § 4(g).
100. H.R. 3017 § 8(a) (3); S. 1584 § 8(a) (3).
101. H.R. 3017 § 8(a) (3); S. 1584 § 8(a) (3).
102. H.R. 3017 § 8(a) (5); S. 1584 § 8(a) (5).
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These latter provisions require a type of reasonable accommodation
to the individual's gender transition.
Like the ENDA of 2007, the new ENDA bills also preserve the
prior rights and remedies the person has under federal and state
law."' This means that even if ENDA passes under its current form,
a person may still have a cause of action under Title VII using the
sex stereotyping doctrine, or conceivably could have a cause of ac-
tion for disparate impact under Title VII if the impact results
because of the individual's sex or gender.
The political future of ENDA 2009 is uncertain. As recently as
November 2009, the Justice Department testified that passage of
this law was its top political agenda and that the Obama Admini-
stration intended to move on it as soon as the health care reform
bill is resolved. 1 4 It is unclear whether the election of Scott Brown,
a Republican, to the former Senate position of Edward Kennedy
will affect the politics surrounding the possible passage of ENDA.
C. The Case Law: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression:
Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals, Intersex, and Transgender Individuals'
Protection by Title VII and State Statutes
Courts have uniformly concluded that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on an individual's sexual orientation or trans-
gender status. For example, in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,0 5 the Ninth Circuit considered three consolidated
cases brought by gays and lesbians who alleged discriminatory
treatment in the workplace or failure to hire because of their sexual
orientation. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Title
VII protects individuals from discrimination based on their sexual
orientation and concluded that when it passed Title VII, Congress
did not intend that the term "sex" be interpreted to include sexual
orientation. After DeSantis, other circuits followed suit.106
The early cases brought by transgender individuals, Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co.,' °7 Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.'°s and
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,109 held that Title VII's prohibition
103. H.R. 3017 § 15; S. 1584 § 15.
104. See Posting of David Ingram to LegalTimes, http://legatimes.typepad.com/blt/
2009/11/employment-discrimination-bill-a-top-piority-doj-says.hnl (Nov. 5, 2009, 12:25 EST).
105. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
106. See supra note 3.
107. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
108. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
109. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337
N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (holding that transsexuals were not protected by prohibition of sex
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against discrimination because of sex did not protect transsexuals
from discrimination based on their identities as transsexuals, even
though there may be a Title VII action if a transsexual is discrimi-
nated against because she is female or he is male. " ' The courts
analogized discrimination based on gender identity, role or expres-
sion to discrimination based on sexual orientation, which the
courts had concluded was not prohibited by Title VII. They con-
cluded that prohibition of discrimination based on transsexuality,
like sexual orientation discrimination, would require Congress to
amend the statute. The courts noted that Congress had bills before
it to amend the statute to protect against sexual orientation dis-
crimination, but that the amendments did not pass both the House
and the Senate. Thus, the courts concluded, without an amend-
ment that covers transsexuals as a protected category, the law does
not prohibit employment discrimination against transsexuals. 1'
Since 1989, however, the United States Supreme Court has de-
cided two cases that blur the bright lines between sex and sexual
orientation and between sex and transgender status. In Price Water-
house v. Hopkins,'12 the Supreme Court expanded the definition of
"because of sex" to include a prohibition to discriminate because
of a person's gender. In this context, "gender" means gender role
or expression, congruity or incongruity with the cultural norms
describing and prescribing the behavior of a person of a particular
biological sex. After Price Waterhouse, a number of courts have con-
cluded that it is illegal to engage in gender discrimination or
harassment because of a person's failure to conform to gendered
expectations in dress and behavior.'
1 3
discrimination in state employment statute). Subsequently, an Iowa statute prohibited dis:
crimination based on gender identity. IOWA CODE § 216.6(1) (2009).
110. A New York court has interpreted the New York gender discrimination provision to
ban discrimination against transsexuals because of their transsexuality. See Maffei v. Kolae-
ton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
111. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-86; see also Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.,
636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that transsexuals were not members of a protected
class in a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)). Recently, at least one court disagreed.
The federal district court in the District of Columbia held that discrimination against a
transsexual because she is changing her sex is discrimination because of sex based on the
clear language of the statute. This case, Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C.
2008), is discussed infra.
112. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
113. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir.
2003); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000). Exceptions to this
doctrine are the appearance and dress code cases that permit an employer to impose "rea-
sonable" differential appearance standards on men and women so long as they do not
impose an unequal burden and do not unreasonably stereotype a particular group. See, e.g.,
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, a successful accountant at the
defendant firm, was denied partnership because the partners per-
ceived her as too masculine and aggressive.' 1 4 Her mentor
explained that she could improve her chances of election to part-
nership if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wearjewelry. ' '1 5 The Court
concluded that evidence of sex stereotyping tainting the decision
making process in Price Waterhouse was sufficient to prove that sex
was a motivating factor in the refusal to promote Hopkins. Under
Price Waterhouse, adverse decision making resulting from an em-
ployee's failure to adhere to sex stereotypes is discrimination
because of sex.' In essence, discrimination because of sex also in-
cludes discrimination based on gender role or expression." 7
Perhaps more than any other recent case, Price Waterhouse has
the potential to change the gender landscape of the workplace.
After Price Waterhouse, women are protected from discrimination
caused by their failure to act or dress according to feminine gen-
der stereotypes. Price Waterhouse, therefore, could not legally
refuse to make Ann Hopkins a partner in the firm based on her
masculine appearance or behavior. Moreover, although some
courts do not agree,"" others conclude that it is illegal to discrimi-
nate against men because of their effeminate dress or behavior."9
The case, however, can also be read narrowly and limited to its
facts. For example, Judge Posner has argued that Price Waterhouse
does not protect effeminate men in all-male workplaces because
these workplaces do not generally discriminate against men in em-
ployment.
12 0
Even with a liberal reading of Price Waterhouse, cases will fall
through the gaps if their facts do not establish that sex stereotyping
114. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 250.
115. Id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618
F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
116. Id. at 250-52.
117. See also Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing district
court's grant of summary judgment because a reasonable jury could conclude that the de-
fendant discharged the plaintiff because of sex stereotyping where there was evidence that
she was aggressive but that men who were aggressive were not discharged).
118. See, e.g., Willborn v. Formosa Plastics Corp. of Tex., No. 13-04-007-CV, 2005 WL
1797022 (Tex. App. July 28, 2005) (refusing to recognize a sex stereotyping cause of action
under federal law for a male plaintiff who alleged he was harassed by his coworkers because
the plaintiff had not demonstrated any United States Supreme Court cases that recognizes
sex stereotyping can be cognizable, and declaring no cause of action exists under Texas
law); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 18, 33, 47 (1995) (discussing how
courts treat effeminate men differently from masculine women).
119. See infra Parts III.C.1 and III.C.3.
120. See Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1066-68 (Posner, J., concurring).
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was a motivating factor in the employment decision. For example,
while there might be a cause of action for feminine men and mas-
culine women, the plaintiff will prevail only if there is evidence that
feminine behavior or dress for men or masculine behavior or dress
for women caused the discrimination. In some cases, this evidence
may be difficult to establish. Homosexual and bisexual plaintiffs
who exhibit gender expressions that comport with societal expecta-
tions for their biological sex may have difficulty proving their cases.
Moreover, in harassment cases, courts have found it difficult to dis-
tinguish between harassment that is motivated by sexual
orientation (which is not forbidden by Title VII) and harassment
motivated by an individual's failure to conform to gender norms
(which is forbidden). 2'
In transgender cases, often the problem arises concerning which
restroom the transgender individual will use. Without a reasonable
accommodation requirement in the case of pre-operative MTF
transsexuals, the individual may not be protected by the Price
Waterhouse stereotyping doctrine. Finally, jurisprudence concerning
reasonable dress and appearance regulation may create some ex-
ceptions to the Price Waterhouse stereotyping doctrine. 22 All of these
potential limitations on Price Waterhouse will be discussed in full be-
low.
The second United States Supreme Court case that may open
the way to broad protections of sexual minorities is Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc. 123 Oncale involved egregious male-on-
male sexual harassment. Joseph Oncale, a roustabout on a Texas
oil rig, alleged that coworkers and supervisors restrained him while
one placed his penis on Oncale's neck and arm, threatened to rape
him and used force to "push a bar of soap into Oncale's anus"
while he was in the shower.124 Oncale testified at his deposition that
he quit his job because he was afraid that he would be raped.'12
Lower courts had split as to whether a cause of action existed un-
der Title VII for same-sex harassment, and, if so, under what
conditions a plaintiff would prevail.2 6 The Supreme Court held
121. See infra Part III.C.1.
122. SeeJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
123. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
124. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'd and remanded, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
125. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
126. See, e.g., Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 568, 570-74 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that if
the behavior is sexual in nature there may be a cause of action for same-sex harassment);
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that there is no cause of action for same-sex harassment where both the alleged victim
and the alleged perpetrator are heterosexuals of the same sex); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N.
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that Title VII creates a cause of action for sexual harassment where
the harassers and the victim are of the same sex if the environment
created is hostile because of the victim's sex.'17 The mere fact that
the perpetrator and the victim are of the same sex is not a bar to a
Tide VII sexual harassment cause of action.1
28
The Court noted that in male-on-female sexual harassment
cases, it is relatively easy to draw the inference that the behavior
occurred because of sex.2 9 Because the behavior is often explicitly
sexual in nature, a reasonable fact finder may conclude that the
behavior would likely not have occurred had the victim been of the
same sex as the perpetrator. 30 The Court also stated that a same-sex
harassment plaintiff may take advantage of the same chain of in-
ference with proof of the homosexuality of the perpetrator.1
However, the Court recognized that harassment can occur because
of one's sex for reasons unrelated to the perpetrator's romantic or
sexual interest in the victim. 32 It suggested three means of proving
that the behavior occurred because of sex in same-sex environ-
ments. First, the plaintiff may prove that the defendant's employee
was homosexual and harbored sexual desire for the plaintiff.
3
Second, the plaintiff may prove that the harasser or harassers ob-
jected to persons of his or her sex in the workplace. 34 Third, the
plaintiff may demonstrate that there was differential treatment at
work of men and women.135 While there is debate concerning
whether these are the exclusive means of proving that the behavior
occurs because of sex, 6 the Oncale Court offered these means of
proof as illustrative, rather than exclusive. 37 Therefore, it should
be clear that plaintiffs may prove that same-sex harassment occurs
because of sex by other means. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized
Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no cause of action under
Title VII for same-sex harassment).
127. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80. State courts generally followed this reasoning in applying
their own state statutes. See, e.g., Barbour v. Dep't of Social Servs., 198 Mich. App. 183 (App.
Ct. 1993) (holding that although the state anti-discrimination act does not proscribe dis-
crimination based on sexual harassment, there is a cause of action for same-sex
discrimination occurring because of sex).
128. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
129. Id. at 80.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 80-81.
133. Id. at 80.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 80-81.
136. Some courts have held or assumed that these are the exclusive means of proving
that the harassment occurs because of sex.
137. 523 U.S. at 80-81.
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that its decision did not turn Title VII into a general civility code.13
It noted that Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical har-
assment in the workplace. 9 Even between men and women
behavior is not automatically discrimination because of sex "merely
because the words used have sexual content or connotations.'
40
Moreover, the Court noted that Title VII requires that the behavior
be sufficiently severe or pervasive from an objective perspective to
alter the terms and conditions of employment.14' Simple and in-
nocuous intersex flirtation or male-on-male horseplay would not
meet this standard.142 In determining whether the behavior meets
the "severe or pervasive" test, the Court stated that the fact finder
should consider "a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships,' '4 3 and a common sense sensibility
to social context to determine whether the behavior is merely sim-
ple teasing or roughhousing, or severely hostile or abusive.
Proving that gender or sexual harassment occurs because of
sex 144 has become increasingly complex since Oncale. Where the
harassing behavior is sexual in nature, courts have little difficulty
finding in a case of male on female harassment that the harass-
ment occurred "because of sex," automatically drawing the
inference that the man's sexual advances, touches, or jokes are re-
lated to the sex of the victim.145 Courts draw this inference because
they generally assume that the purpose for the sexual behavior is to
forward the romantic interests of the perpetrator. 46 The courts rea-
son that the perpetrator, presumably a heterosexual in a male-on-
female harassment case, would not have behaved the same way
with a person of his own sex. 147 Courts have had greater problems
concluding that same-sex harassment occurs "because of sex,"
138. Id.
139. Id. at 80.
140. Id.
141. Id. at81.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 82.
144. See generally Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment
"Because of Sex", 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1151 (2008).
145. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimi-
nation easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the
challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is
reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same
sex."); see also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting "it is gener-
ally taken as a given that when a female employee is harassed in explicitly sexual ways by a
male worker or workers, she has been discriminated against 'because of' her sex."), vacated,
523 U.S. 998 (1998).
146. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
147. See id.
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especially where there is no evidence that the harasser is gay or
lesbian.
1 4 8
Since Oncale, plaintiffs in same-sex hostile environment cases,
with varying degree of success, have used the sex stereotyping doc-
trine of Price Waterhouse to prove that their harassment occurred
"because of sex." Male plaintiffs alleging harassment by other men
compare their situation to that of Ann Hopkins, who was denied
partner status because she did not live up to the ideals of feminin-
ity held by the partners. Male coworkers and supervisors harassed
male plaintiffs, they argue, because they do not live up to the tradi-
tional ideal of masculinity. Transgender individuals, especially
transwomen,'149 have also adopted the Price Waterhouse doctrine to
argue that they have suffered discrimination because they do not
live up to the masculine stereotypes that accompany their birth sex,
or because, despite having transitioned to women, they do not con-
form to prescribed norms of female beauty.
1. Protecting Gays and Lesbians Through Price Waterhouse
Many post-Oncale courts accept that Price Waterhouse's stereotyp-
ing doctrine applies to hostile work environment harassment
cases, 50 but they struggle with the question of whether the hostile
work environment is due to sex stereotyping, which would create a
cause of action under Title VII,1'M or to the alleged victim's sexual
148. SeeDoe, 119 F.3d at 575.
149. Transsexuals who are born male but transition to female.
150. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1064 (7th Cir.
2003) (accepting the use of the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory where applicable but
concluding that the plaintiff's case was not a sex stereotyping case as a matter of law);
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming lower court's
grant of summary judgment because evidence shows that plaintiff was harassed because of
his apparent homosexuality, and not sexual stereotyping); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that Price Waterhouse creates
a cause of action for men who suffer discrimination because of their lack of masculinity);
Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm'n v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL 2202641
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and stating
that it was a question of fact whether the defendant harassed him because he was not suffi-
ciently masculine where the plaintiff did not tell the coworkers he was gay and there was no
evidence that they thought he was gay even though the comments they directed at him were
"homo" and "faggot"). But see David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation
Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1743 (2002) (concluding that
Oncale does not stand for the proposition that harassment based on non-conformity to gen-
der norms is sex discrimination).
151. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(where three judges concluded that Rene, a homosexual who had endured attacks and
taunts in a same-sex environment, had a cause of action under the sex-stereotyping theory of
Price Waterhouse); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
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orientation (or perceived sexual orientation), which courts hold is
not covered by Title VI1.
1512
The cases demonstrate that drawing this line is virtually impossi-
ble. '53 Since Oncale, the courts of appeals have dealt with the issue
in a number of cases; a number concluded that the plaintiff made
out a cause of action ' 54 for sex stereotyping; with nearly identical
that the plaintiff, an "effeminate man," had a cause of action under Title VII, using the Price
Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory, for same-sex hostile work environment harassment where
his coworkers subjected him to taunts).
152. See, e.g., Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062 (affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment in a Title VII case alleging same-sex hostile work environment because the evi-
dence supported only work performance conflicts or harassment based on perceived sexual
orientation, not sexual stereotyping); Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (affirming lower court's
grant of summary judgment because evidence showed that plaintiff was harassed because of
his apparent homosexuality, and not sexual stereotyping).
153. One court states that such a claim "requires us to navigate the tricky legal waters of
male-on-male sex harassment." Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062.
154. See Miller v. City of New York, No. 04-5536-CV, 2006 WL 1116094 (2d Cir. Apr. 26,
2006) (overturning district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant where the
plaintiff, a small man with a disability, produced evidence that he was given more difficult
work and treated worse because he was not manly enough); Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068-69 (plu-
rality decision reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant,
and three judges concluding that Rene had preserved his case of sex stereotyping for appeal
where the plaintiff was openly gay and his coworkers had teased him about the way he
walked, whistled at him, caressed his buttocks, blew kisses at him, touched his body and his
face, called him "muneca" or doll); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 870, 874 (holding that the district
court improperly granted judgment in a bench trial to the defendant where throughout
plaintiff's employment his male coworkers and a supervisor subjected him to name-calling
such as "her" and "she," mocked him for carrying a tray "like a woman" and for not having
sex with a waitress who was his friend, called him "faggot" and "fucking female whore," and
directed "the most vulgar name-calling ... cast in female terms."); Schmedding v. Tnemec
Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the lower court improperly granted a
motion to dismiss a heterosexual male's claim alleging that his coworkers harassed him,
calling him a "homo" and 'jerk off," unbuttoned his clothing, patted him on the buttocks,
asked him to perform sexual acts, scratched his crotch and humped his door frame, con-
cluding that "simply because some of the harassment alleged by Schmedding includes taunts
of being homosexual or other epithets connoting homosexuality, the complaint is [not]
thereby transformed from one alleging harassment based on sex to one alleging harassment
based on sexual orientation."); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx),
2008 WL 4948664 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss where
the plaintiff alleged he was a gay man and that the defendant discriminated against him for
his failure to adhere to sex stereotypes); Rhea v. Collar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 04-2254 ML/V,
2005 WL 2600213 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 12, 2005) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment even though the plaintiff stated that he believed he was discriminated against be-
cause of his sexual orientation because the issue is whether the defendant viewed him as too
effeminate, not whether he believed they did); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club,
195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002) (denying summaryjudgment to defendant where there was
sufficient evidence that lesbian was harassed because she failed to adhere to feminine
stereotypes); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002) (denying summary
judgment where the plaintiff, a gay man, presented evidence that the employer harassed
and retaliated against him because of his failure to adhere to masculine stereotypes; even
though the evidence can also show that he was discriminated against because of his sexual
orientation, this evidence is not a bar to his recovery); see also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding before Oncale that the plaintiffs had made out a cause of
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facts, others held that the plaintiff did not. In the latter, the courts
held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was harassed because of
his sexual orientation or "perceived homosexuality" rather than for
his failure to conform to sex stereotypes.155
Although decided differently by the courts, the cases are indis-
tinguishable. Typically the cases arise in an all male or virtually all
male environment. Coworkers and/or supervisors use vulgar verbal
taunts as well as physical attacks, often to sexual organs of the vic-
tim, to harass him. Moreover, the taunts invariably include
comments questioning the victim's masculinity and his sexual ori-
entation. Terms such as "bitch," "fag," "queer," "homo," and "sissy,"
actions such as the grabbing of testicles, questions asking whether a
person is male or female or "takes it up the ass," and threats of
rape are common. It would be impossible for the courts, the juries,
action for sex stereotyping where coworkers subjected two 16-year-old boys to relentless
harassment, called them "fat boy," "fag," "queer," "bitch," asked them "[aire you a boy or a
girl," threatened to take them "out to the woods" and grabbed their testicles), vacated, 523
U.S. 998 (1998). While Doe was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Oncale, Doe's alter-
native holding based on sex stereotyping is probably still good law. See Hamm, 332 F.3d at
1063 (citing to Doe for sex stereotyping holding and distinguishing it on its facts); Bibby v.
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the Doe
holding concerning sex stereotyping is still good law).
155. See Kiley v. Am. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, No. 07-0793-cv, 2008
WL 4442468 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2008) (dismissing complaint of pro se litigant stating that she
may not use sex stereotyping to "bootstrap" a sexual orientation discrimination case into a
violation of Title VII); Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1058 (affirming grant of summary judgment to the
defendant because no reasonable jury could conclude that the harassment plaintiff suffered
was sex stereotyping rather than caused by his work performance or his perceived homo-
sexuality where coworkers regularly threatened plaintiff in vulgar terms, called him "faggot,"
"bisexual," and "girl scout," and spread rumors that he was gay, warning others not to bend
over in front of him); Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 F. App'x 48 (3d Cir. 2005) (up-
holding summary judgment grant to the defendant because court concluded that facts show
discrimination based on sexual orientation and not based on gender stereotypes); Bibby, 260
F.3d at 257 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment because the plaintiff did
not present sufficient evidence that the harassment was because of sex where the plaintiff, a
gay man, was assaulted at work, told by his assaulter, "everybody knows you're a faggot," and
"everybody knows you take it up the ass," called "sissy," mistreated by his supervisors, and
alleged he was discriminated against because of his sexual orientation); Spearman, 231 F.3d
at 1082-83 (affirming lower court's grant of summary judgment and concluding that the
harassment was because of plaintiff's perceived sexual orientation where coworkers called
plaintiff "little bitch," "cheap ass bitch," "[ylou f-ingjack-off, pussy-ass," threatened to "f-
[his] gay faggot ass up," wrote graffiti on the bulletin board stating, "Aids kills faggots dead
... RuPaul, RuSpearman." (after RuPaul, a black male drag queen)); Equal Empl. Oppor-
tunity Comm'n v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008) (granting summary judgment to the defendant because evidence
points to discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation rather than stereotyping);
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-259, 2007 WL 2702664 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2007)
(granting summary judgment to the defendant where the evidence points to sexual orienta-
tion discrimination); Martin v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting summary judgment to defendant on sex stereotyping claim, con-
cluding that all evidence showed discrimination based on sexual orientation).
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the victims, or even the perpetrators to distinguish between behav-
ior that is motivated by the victim's failure to conform to gender
stereotypes and behavior motivated by the victim's sexual orienta-
tion.1
56
For example, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterpries,"157 the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had a cause of action because
his coworkers harassed him because of his effeminate behavior-
behavior that did not comport with the masculine expectations of a
man. Mr. Nichols' male coworkers and supervisor subjected him to
name-calling such as "her" and "she," mocked him for carrying a
tray "like a woman" and for not having sex with a waitress who was
his friend, called him "faggot" and "fucking female whore," and
directed at him "the most vulgar name-calling ... cast in female
terms."l5
The court's treatment of Nichols contrasts to that of Prowel v. Wise
Business Forms. 59 In Prowel, the plaintiff suffered repeated com-
ments and mocking of his effeminate mannerisms and appearance,
name calling such as "Rosebud," "Princess," and "faggot," offensive
phone calls, and graffiti in the men's room about AIDS. The court
held that as a matter of law the facts alleged demonstrated dis-
crimination motivated by sexual orientation rather than sex
stereotyping, and refused to permit the plaintiff to "bootstrap" a
sexual orientation claim under Title VII in the name of a sex
stereotyping claim.
In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.,61 the plaintiff, a butler on the
top floor of the hotel, worked with other male butlers and a male
supervisor. He alleged that, over the course of two years, his co-
workers subjected him to name-calling such as "muneca" ("doll" in
Spanish) and poking and prodding, including putting their fingers
in his anus through his clothing.6 2 The defense conceded that the
environment was severe or pervasive, but challenged whether the
behavior occurred because of sex. 16 3 A majority of the en banc
court concluded, in two opinions with different rationales, that
Rene had presented sufficient evidence of a Title VII violation to
156. For an interesting discussion of male feminism, male and heterosexual privilege
and the fear heterosexual men have of being portrayed as not heterosexual, see Devon W.
Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76, 97-104, 108-11 (2000).
157. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
158. Id. at 870, 874.
159. Prowel, 2007 WL 2702664.
160. Id. at *4.
161. 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
162. Id. at 1064.
163. Id. at 1066.
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go to a jury.'A The plurality concluded that the plaintiffs sexual
orientation was not relevant in the inquiry and a reasonable jury
could conclude, based on the sexual nature of the behavior, that
the harassment occurred because of sex.165 This opinion contra-
venes most other appellate opinions that hold that sexual behavior
alone is insufficient to satisfy the "because of sex" requirement.
The concurrence concluded that there was sufficient evidence that
the coworkers harassed the plaintiff because he did not live up to
the sexual stereotype of how a man should act and appear.
1 66
Judge Proctor Hug dissented, joined by three other members of
the court, and concluded that the mere fact that the harassment is
sexual in nature does not prove that it occurred because of sex.'67
Moreover, the dissent concluded, there was no cause of action for
sex stereotyping in this case because the plaintiff admitted un-
equivocally and repeatedly in his deposition that the reason his
coworkers abused him was because of his sexual orientation.
168
Judge Hug distinguished Nichols because Nichols was discriminated
against based on his effeminate behavior at work, whereas Rene
was discriminated against based on his sexual orientation-
behavior that occurred outside of work.
165
Judge Hug's dissent seems to make a distinction between sexual
orientation and gender identity or expression. He sees expression
of gender identity at work as protected behavior, but characterizes
sexual orientation as unprotected behavior occurring outside of
the workplace.1 7 The court in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Centerd7 1
reaches a similar conclusion. It upholds the lower court's grant of
the defendant's motion to dismiss because the gender non-
conforming behavior alleged to support the sex stereotyping claim
was not behavior observed at work or affecting job performance.
Rather than sex discrimination for failure to conform to gender
expectations, the alleged harassment, such as teasing for sexual
practices, more likely occurred because of the plaintiff's perceived
homosexuality.
7 2
164. Id. at 1068.
165. Id. at 1067.
166. Id. at 1069.
167. Id. at 1074 (HugJ., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1077.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
172. Id. at 763; see also Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (holding that male cross-dresser who cross-dresses outside of
work did not have a sex stereotyping discrimination claim when he was fired because he was
discriminated against not because he was effeminate but because he assumed the role of a
woman outside of work). But see Depiano v. Ad. County, No. 02-5441, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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While theoretically it is possible to draw a line between sexual
orientation and gender expression at work, as demonstrated above,
it is very difficult to separate motivations of the perpetrators who
harass a homosexual co-worker whose dress or behavior do not
conform to gender stereotypes. In the case of the homosexual co-
worker, the question becomes whether the discrimination occurs
because of his homosexuality or because of his gender expression
that does not conform to sex stereotypes. Because of these practi-
cal difficulties, Judge Hug's distinction may amount to a
conclusion that heterosexuals may bring sex stereotyping claims,
but homosexuals may not. This distinction would deny rights to a
whole class of persons, and would lead to intrusions into the pri-
vacy of individuals. Moreover, some courts have already concluded
that Title VII does not forbid the creation of a hostile work envi-
ronment based on an individual's "perceived homosexuality." In
these cases, even heterosexuals (who are perceived as homosexu-
als) would suffer harassment without recourse.
A concurrence by Judge Richard Posner in Hamm v. Weyauwega
Milk Products, Inc.173 raises similar questions about the stereotyping
doctrine. He concludes that harassing a man because he is effemi-
nate in an all male workplace is not discrimination because of sex
because such harassment would discriminate only against a particu-
lar sub-class of men-those who are effeminate. 174 Judge Posner
reaches this odd conclusion despite the Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta that it is illegal sex discrimination to dis-
criminate against a subclass of women who are mothers.7" He argues
that in a traditionally male workplace such as Price Waterhouse, sex
stereotyping of a woman is evidence of sex discrimination, and evi-
dence that an employer refused to hire or promote a woman
because she is masculine likely shows discrimination against women
as a class. 76 This is particularly true, he argues, in traditionally mas-
culine jobs such as firefighting because those jobs require masculine
characteristics and women with masculine traits are those who would
qualify for the position.'7 7 Eliminating women with masculine char-
acteristics may eliminate most women who are interested in or
capable of acting as firefighters.1" But in an all-male workplace,
20250 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2005) (concluding that there is a cause of action under the NewJer-
sey Law Against Discrimination, applying Price Waterhouse where the plaintiff was ridiculed
and harassed for cross-dressing outside of work).
173. 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-68 (7th Cir. 2003) (PosnerJ., concurring).
174. Id. at 1067.
175. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
176. 332 F.3d at 1067 (Posner,J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1068.
178. Id.
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Posner argues, discrimination against a man because he is effemi-
nate is not sex discrimination against men; it is merely
discrimination against effeminate men. 79 This argument misses the
point, however, that permitting discrimination against effeminate
men is a means of enforcing the masculinity of the job which, in
turn, creates barriers not only to effeminate men, but also to women
who would be interested in the job.
Moreover, in his discussion of how courts apply the Price Water-
house stereotyping doctrine, Judge Posner assumes that if courts
distinguish between discrimination based on failure to meet sex
stereotypes and discrimination based on homosexuality, effeminate
heterosexual men would be protected, but effeminate homosexual
men would not. Other courts reaching this question are in clear
disagreement with Posner. According to these courts, the sexual
orientation of the plaintiff is irrelevant in deciding whether the
discrimination occurs because of sex. 8 In other words, it is neces-
sary to consider whether the discrimination occurred because of
the plaintiffs failure to conform to sex stereotypes, whether the
plaintiff is heterosexual or homosexual. If it does, then the plaintiff
has a cause of action.
Theoretically these courts are correct. It is possible, as a theo-
retical matter, to distinguish between discrimination based on
sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender identity
and expression. But practically speaking, Judge Posner has a point.
The cases demonstrate that it is nearly impossible to distinguish
between sexual stereotyping discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination because the means used to discriminate or harass
are virtually identical, and even the harassers are likely unaware of
their exact motivations.
2. Protecting Bisexuals' s'
The 2009 version of ENDA protects an employee or applicant
from discrimination based on sexual orientation. s2 Sexual orienta-
tion is defined to include heterosexuality, homosexuality and
179. Id. at 1067.
180. Rene v MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001).
181. While I have located "bisexuals" under the category "sexual orientation," and
ENDA categorizes bisexuality as a sexual orientation that is protected by the law, bisexuality
is not exactly a sexual orientation. Rather it is a view of gender and sexuality that rejects
barriers and strict limitations imposed by heterosexuality or homosexuality. It sees sexuality
as an identity, but more fluid, changeable and expressive than any fixed identity would be.
182. H.R. 3017, lllth Cong. § 4 (2009); S. 1584, lllth Cong. § 4 (2009).
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bisexuality.1 83 Like homosexuals, bisexuals suffer discrimination
because of their sexual affiliation with same-sex partners, but they
also suffer discrimination that does not affect lesbians and gays.
This is discrimination based on their bisexuality "because [bisexu-
als] upset the dichotomies in a polarized world.' '0 4 There are only a
few reported cases, federal or state, that deal with discrimination in
employment based on an individual's bisexuality, and none of
them finds such discrimination actionable. 185 But if 2009 ENDA is
enacted into law, there will likely be cases alleging discrimination
based on bisexuality.
Bisexuality may present the courts with difficulties similar to the
line-drawing between sexual orientation and sex stereotyping in
which the courts engage today. To the extent that the bisexual in-
dividual suffers discrimination or harassment because of the sex of
her partners, courts will likely consider the discrimination illegal
under ENDA if the law passes. But, given that some bisexuals see
their identities as working against sexual barriers, and some engage
in a more fluid sexuality including pansexuality and polyamory,1s6 it
may be that courts will be unwilling to interpret the law to protect
bisexual persons who engage in these practices. Courts will likely
conclude that this is behavior rather than identity and is not pro-
tected by ENDA or, in the event that gender identity does not
survive as a protected characteristic, that this behavior is part of
gender identity that is not covered by the statute. This analysis
would be reminiscent of Judge Hug's dissent in Rene and of the
court's analysis in Vickers. 1 7 If, however, we are to protect sexual
minorities, the courts should not distinguish between behavior oc-
curring at the worksite and gender identity or status.
183. H.R. 3017§3(a)(9);S. 1584§3(a)(9).
184. Jillian Todd Weiss, GL vs. BT: The Archeology of Biphobia and Transphobia within the
U.S. Gay and Lesbian Community, in BISEXUALITY AND TRANSGENDERISM: INTERSEXIONS OF
THE OTHERS, supra note 17, at 25, 34.
185. See, e.g., Blaylock v. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 07-464 (KSH), 2009 WL 2606245
(D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2009) (holding that discrimination based on bisexuality is not sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII); Parrella v. Lawrence & Mem'l Hosp., No. 3:08-CV-1445(PCD), 2009
WL 1279290 (D. Conn. May 5, 2009) (same).
186. Pansexuality is the "openness to all forms of sexuality" and polyamory is engage-
ment in sexual relations with multiple partners. SeeWeiss, supra note 184, at 34.
187. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006); Rene v MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002).
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3. Recognizing Transgender Individuals and Transsexuals
a. Background on Transgender Status
Approximately two to five percent of persons are transgender,
defined as a person who experiences some gender dysphoria.'
88
Recendy, the term "transgender" in political discourse has nearly
completely replaced the term "transsexual.' 9 I use the term
"transsexual" to refer to persons who live permanently in a gender
into which they were not born. "Transgender" is a broader term. It
includes transsexuals and other individuals. Male-to-female (MTF)
transsexuals or "transwomen" are individuals born male who tran-
sition to women. Female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals or "transmen"
are individuals born female who transition to men.' 90 Transgender
individuals who are not transsexuals include cross-dressers who
wear the clothing of the "opposite" biological sex for emotional
purposes, and transvestites who dress in the "opposite" sex's cloth-
ing for sexual reasons,' 9' androgynous, bigendered, and gendered
queer people.' 92 These last three groups generally include a mixed
or alternating identity, but exact definitions vary from person to
person. Moreover, many of these people find the gender categories
themselves restrictive.9  Finally, while the medical definition of
persons with gender identity disorder excludes intersex individu-
als, some intersex persons may be considered transgender by the
transgender community.
While it is difficult to estimate the incidence of transsexualism,
some estimate that approximately 1 in 30,000 biological males are
transsexuals and 1 in 100,000 biological females are transsexuals.'
94
Others estimate that the number of transsexuals is about 1 in 50,000
188. Transgender Law & Policy Inst., Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, http://
www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
189. Kristen Rose Schilt, Just One of the Guys?: How Female-to-Male Transmen Make
Gender Inequality at Work Visible (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
190. See id. at 9 (explaining the terms "transmen" and "transwomen").
191. See id. at 18.
192. There are other groups of persons whose gender identity and expression are more
ambiguous or fluid. See Candace Moore & Kristen Schilt, Is She Man Enough?: Female Mascu-
linities on The L Word, in READING THE L WORD: OUTING CONTEMPORARY TELEVISION 159
(Kim Akass &Janet McCabe eds., 2006) (discussing the different types of female masculinity
missing from the television show).
193. See American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 4.
194. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 535 (4th ed. 1994); see also Transgender Law & Policy Inst., supra note
188 (stating that statistics from the Netherlands demonstrated that 1 in 12,000 men undergo
sex reassignment surgery and I in 34,000 women undergo sex reassignment surgery).
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for both male and female populations. 195 These estimates have been
challenged, however, by the community of transsexuals who claim
that the numbers are much higher. The estimates, according to the
community, undercount because they refer only to those who seek
genital surgery, but many transsexuals do not choose surgery. More-
over, community estimates place the numbers of MTF and FTM
transsexuals as approximately equal.9 In large part because the sex
reassignment surgery for FTM transmen is less successful than for
MTF transwomen, far fewer transmen have such surgery.
Statistics demonstrate that transgender individuals suffer dis-
crimination in the workplace. A written statement of testimony
presented to Congress by the Transgender Law Center in San Fran-
cisco noted that a 2006 survey conducted of 194 transgender
persons in San Francisco demonstrated that 60 percent of those sur-
veyed earned less than $15,300 per year and only 8 percent earned
more than $45,900.198 Moreover, only 25 percent worked full time
with 9 percent having no income.19' Finally, 57 percent stated that
they had experienced employment discrimination, but only 12 per-
cent took any action about the discrimination.2 0 Testimony before
the House Labor and Education Committee presented by Bradley
Sears of the Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law stated that
transgender individuals suffer significantly in the labor market with
high rates of poverty and unemployment attributable to discrimina-
tion. 201 The 2008 Survey of the Transgender Law Center reported
that 25 percent of transgender persons in California earn wages be-
low the poverty line, and that the average income of those with
Bachelor's degrees is 40 percent lower than that of the overall aver-
age income of college graduates in California. 202 Less than one-half
of transgender individuals are employed full time, and those who
are employed report high levels of discrimination and harassment in
the workplace.2 3
195. See Schilt, supra note 189, at 3.
196. Schilt & Wiswall, supra note 4, at I n.2.
197. See infra notes 307-309 and accompanying text.
198. See An Examination of Discrimination Against Transgender Americans in the Workplace:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educa-
tion & Labor, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of The Transgender Law Center).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R 3017 Before the H.
Comm. on Education & Labor, I11th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Bradley Sears, Executive
Director, Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law).
202. ELEANOR HARTZELL ET AL., TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, THE STATE OF TRANS-
GENDER CALIFORNIA REPORT: RESULTS FROM THE 2008 CALIFORNIA TRANSGENDER
ECONoMic HEALTH SURVEY 7 (2009).
203. Id. at8-12.
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Furthermore, a recent study by sociologists Kristen Schilt and
Matthew Wiswall examined the pay of transsexuals who were em-
ployed before and after transitioning from one sex to another. The
study found that there is a large transgender penalty in pay for
both MTF and FTM transsexuals. °4 MTF transsexuals ("trans-
women"), however, suffered substantially more in both pay
reductions and in terms and conditions of employment than their
FTM ("transmen") counterparts. °5 Transwomen lost approximately
one-third of their income by becoming female while transmen ac-
tually gained slightly when they transitioned to men (but still made
less than their male colleagues at work) .26 Moreover, an earlier
study showed that transwomen experienced harassment and ter-
mination once they began transition, with some of the most
virulent harassment occurring in blue collar workplaces. 7 This
harassment occurred even though the transwomen reported that
as men they fit into the masculine workplace culture before transi-
tioning to women. Transmen, in contrast, experienced fewer
obstacles than their MTF counterparts, often gaining increased
authority, pay, and respect at work when they began to work as
men, even when they occupied the same jobs that they did as
208
women.
Anecdotal evidence produced in Schilt's study also supported
these conclusions. Five transmen praised their workplaces for their
tolerance and acceptance while two transwomen emphasized
workplace problems. One transwoman received notes on her desk
telling her to quit, and found the women's restroom "booby
trapped"; another was laid off as soon as she began to present as a
female.2 09 Ben Barres, a transman neurobiology professor at Stan-
ford University, explains that when he was a woman others
constantly questioned him and undermined his work. Now that he
has transitioned to a man, audiences who are unaware of his gen-
der transition tell him that his research is much better than that of
his "sister."10
From the empirical data, the interviews, and the anecdotes,
Schilt and Wiswall conclude that the "male gender carries a work-
place benefit that cannot be carried over in a gender transition..2 .
204. See Schilt & Wiswall, supra note 4, at 14.
205. Id. at 13, 16-17, 19.
206. Id. at 12.
207. Id. at 16-17 (citing Schilt, supra note 189).
208. Id. at 17 (citing Kristen Schilt, Just One of the Guys?: How Transmen Make Gender Visi-
ble at Work, 20 GENDER & Soc'y 465, 475-82 (2006)).
209. Id. at 16.
210. Id. at19.
211. Id.
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Schilt found in an earlier study that transmen experience an easier
transition in the workplace than transwomen.212 This transition can
be attributed to a number of factors. First, transmen pass much
more quickly because male hormones have a swift masculinizing
effect on women's bodies.213 Second, transmen face much less scru-
tiny than transwomen. As soon as transmen begin to grow beards,
people who do not know they are transgender do not question
their male credentials. Even when transmen are open about the
transition, their colleagues seem to understand and approve (or at
least, not disapprove) of the transition. When transwomen transi-
tion into women, in contrast, their colleagues question why a man
would want to become a woman.214 These reactions demonstrate
how gender stereotypes "privilege masculinity and discredit femi-
ninity. 2 15 Dr. Schilt discusses the differences in workplace
acceptance between transwomen and transmen:
Transwomen report a wide array of workplace barriers in
open transition, including charges that they are mentally un-
stable, they lack command presence, they are disruptive to
productivity, and, if they work with children, that they are
threats to children's gender identities. While transmen face
some gender harassment, particularly in blue-collar occupa-
tions-occupational contexts that often foster sexism and
homophobia-they more often are welcomed into being one
of the guys at work. 16
Moreover, by studying both stealth transmen (those whom their
coworkers did not know were transmen) and open transmen who
transition while at the same workplace, Schilt was able to describe
the dynamics of how gender was enacted at the workplace. As out-
siders who have crossed the gender divide, stealth transmen can
recognize the benefits they receive and how men discredit women
at work and promote homosociality.2 7 Transmen who openly tran-
sition at work describe how coworkers demonstrate support by
"doing gender" with open transmen and by treating them like one
of the guys at work.18
212. Schilt, supra note 189.
213. Id. at 5.
214. Id. at 5-6.
215. Id. at 6.
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at7.
218. Id.
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But perhaps even more notable is the interaction of race, sexual
orientation, class, and height with gender to create barriers or
open doors to employees in the workplace. The study of transsexu-
als has illuminated this variation because only transgender
individuals have lived on both sides of the gender divide. Schilt
found that stealth and open transmen were treated better than
they were as women by coworkers, bosses, and customers. All at-
tributed more authority, respect and privilege to the transmen
after the transition than the women received before the transition.
And transmen who were white, tall and heterosexual received
many more benefits in workplaces than those who were short, ra-
2111
cial minorities or did not pass as men.
These facts demonstrate a clear but unequal discrimination
against persons based on their transgender status in combination
with race, sexuality, and height, and raise the question of whether
the law protects persons who are transgender from employment
discrimination. The answer is that the results are mixed.
b. Title VII and Transgender Individuals
There is a split in the courts as to whether Title VII protects per-
sons who are transsexual or transgendered. The early cases
concluded that discrimination occurred, not because of the per-
son's sex, but because the person was transgender or transsexual.
Therefore, according to the early cases, there was no cause of ac-
tion under Title VII. Many cases still reach the same conclusion.
Under Price Waterhouse, however, a growing number of courts con-
clude that although transgender persons are not a protected class,
an employer violates Title VII if it discriminates against a trans-
gender person because of his or her failure to comply with sexual
or gender stereotypes. Thus, like homosexuals and bisexuals,
transgender persons may enjoy partial coverage by the statute, but
their method of proof is difficult and their efforts are often unsuc-
cessful. More remarkable, a recent federal district court case broke
with the early cases and concluded that discrimination because of
an individual's status as transsexual is discrimination because of
220
sex.
Title VII forbids discrimination because of an individual's sex.
The legislative history of the statute demonstrates that Congress
219. Id. at 14-15.
220. For a discussion of this case, Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C.
2008), see infra text accompanying notes 249-272.
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thought little about the definition of "sex." In fact, legislators sup-
porting Title VII focused primarily on eliminating race
discrimination in employment. "Sex" was added as a forbidden
category by opponents of Title VII in an attempt to defeat the bill.
Ironically, the bill passed. There is no legislative history that ex-
plains what "sex" means, but there is little doubt that in 1963
Congress had no interest in reaching discrimination based on
gender identity or expression. Those who voted for the bill with
the "sex" amendment most likely considered "sex" to mean bio-
logical male and biological female.
Courts deciding early cases brought by transsexuals relied on
this legislative history to conclude that the statute does not protect
transsexuals against employment discrimination.221 There has been,
however, a recent increase in court cases alleging employment dis-
crimination against transsexuals and a significant change in Title
VII law as applied to employment discrimination against trans-
sexuals.
i. Using Price Waterhouse to Protect Rights of Transgender Workers
Soon after Price Waterhouse was decided, transsexual plaintiffs
brought Title VII cases alleging that their employers discriminated
against them because of their failure to meet stereotyped gender
expectations. While a few courts dismissed the complaints as not
adequately pleading sex stereotyping, other courts were receptive
to the argument, at least in response to motions to dismiss and mo-
tions for summary judgment.222
In Smith v. City of Salem, 223 the Sixth Circuit held that a transsex-
ual plaintiff who alleged that she was discriminated and retaliated
against because of her failure to conform to sex stereotypes had a
cause of action under Title VII. The plaintiff alleged that she was a
MTF transsexual firefighter who had worked for the department
for seven years before she was diagnosed with Gender Identity Dis-
order (GID) .24 As a man, the plaintiff had no negative incidents
with the department. When she was diagnosed, she began to ex-
press a more feminine appearance in accordance with the medical
221. See supra note 5.
222. Cf Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000) (holding in a
case brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act that the lower court erroneously dis-
missed a complaint of sex discrimination against the defendant bank which refused to give a
loan to a biological man who presented at the bank in female clothing, and told the plaintiff
that if he wanted a loan he would have to return in men's clothing).
223. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
224. Id. at 568.
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protocols for treating GID, and told her boss about her treat-
ment.2 5 Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs superiors decided that they
would require the plaintiff to undergo three psychological evalua-
tions with physicians of the City's choice in order to encourage the
plaintiff to resign. 6 If she refused to comply, the defendants
22d7planned to terminate her on the grounds of insubordination.
Two days later, Smith's counsel advised the defendants of Smith's
legal representation and the potential ramifications if the City con-
tinued to follow its plan.2 2 8 The plaintiff filed a charge with the
EEOC and received a right to sue letter.29 Within four days, Smith
was suspended based on an alleged infraction of a little-known pol-
iy230icy.
The federal district court granted the defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, concluding that the complaint
amounted to a claim for discrimination because the plaintiff was a
transsexual.2 3' The Sixth Circuit overturned the federal district
court, holding that Price Waterhouse enabled the plaintiff to prove
that she was discriminated against because her appearance and
behavior did not conform to the sex stereotypes that the defen-
dants had of a man. 2 The court noted that the plaintiff alleged
that she was fired soon after she began to assume a feminine ap-
pearance and dress, and noted that her coworkers began
commenting on the plaintiff's appearance and mannerisms as not
sufficiently masculine.23
In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,2 4 the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, a pre-operative MTF transsexual
police officer. The plaintiff was living as a pre-operative MTF trans-
sexual when she failed the probationary period required for a
promotion to sergeant.235 Barnes worked as a police officer for 17
years as a man, but at the time that she took the test for the promo-
tion to sergeant, she was living as a woman outside of work and
working as a man while on duty.236 Barnes had a reputation as a
homosexual, bisexual or a cross-dresser in the police department.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 569.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 567, 569.
232. Id. at 572.
233. Id.
234. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
235. Id. at 733.
236. Id. at 733-34.
[VOL. 43:3
Erasing Boundaries
Barnes did well on the sergeant's test, but the defendant con-
cluded that she had failed the probationary period, even though
no other officer had ever failed probation. During the probation-
ary period for her promotion to sergeant, the plaintiff began to
express herself at work in a more feminine manner, at times ap-
pearing at work with lipstick or make-up.23 7 She was placed in a
training program that required daily evaluation. No other ser-
geants were evaluated in this manner. Moreover, the colonel who
submitted the report recommending that the plaintiff failed proba-
tion had told the plaintiff that she did not appear to be
"masculine" and that she should stop wearing makeup and act
more masculine. Others rated the plaintiff as lacking "command
presence," a category that they defined in various ways, some seem-
ing to judge masculinity.2 9 The court upheld the jury verdict in
Barnes' favor, and concluded that there was sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant
failed the plaintiff in her probationary period because she did not
live up to the masculine stereotype. 2' ° Thus, there was sufficient
evidence of a violation of Title VII under Price Waterhouse.
241In Schwenk v. Hartford; a case brought by a transgender pris-
oner under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the complaint alleged that a
prison guard violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishment" and the Gender Motivated Violence
Act.242 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant demanded that the
plaintiff perform oral sex upon him and when the plaintiff refused,
shoved him against the wall and forced his penis against the plain-
tiff's buttocks.243 The Ninth Circuit noted the reasoning in Holloway
and Ulane, which concluded that transsexuals were not protected
by Title VII, but concluded that Price Waterhouse had overruled
those earlier cases by holding that Title VII barred discrimination
against a person because of his or her failure to adhere to gender
stereotypes. 44 Schwenk held that the plaintiff had made out a cause
of action for gender discrimination based on the Price Waterhouse
doctrine because the prison guard may have acted based on his
belief that the plaintiff was effeminate and did not conform to the
gender expectations of a man. In a particularly insightful opinion
237. Id. at 734.
238. Id. at 735.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 737-38.
241. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
242. Id. at 1192.
243. Id. at 1194.
244. Id. at 1201-02.
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that apparently understood masculinity theory and the psychologi-
cal literature supporting it, the court characterized all prison rape
as occurring because of sex and explained the role of masculinity
and femininity in prison rapes:
[Y]oung, slight, physically weak male inmates, particularly
those with "feminine" physical characteristics, are routinely
raped, often by groups of men.... The victims of these at-
tacks are frequently called female names and terms indicative
of gender animus like "pussy" and "bitch" during the assaults
and thereafter.... After they are raped, victims are consigned
to "passive" female sexual and social roles within the
prison.... In contrast, prison rapists commit assaults in part
to establish and maintain a masculine gender. According to
the psychological literature ... prison rapists strongly resist
the characterization of their activities as homosexual. Instead,
they conceive their sexual partners as female members of the
prison social order. Thus, as with rape in general, all prison
rape occurs "because of' gender-both that of the rapist and
that of his victim.
245
The concept that rape and other severe harassment perpetrated
by men on men occurs because of sex is not limited to prisons. In
workplaces, too, men harass other men in order to prove their own
masculinity and to police the masculinity of the job. This behavior
necessarily occurs because of sex or gender, both of the harasser
and of the victim.
246
Federal district courts and some state courts have also used Price
Waterhouse to find a cause of action for transgender individuals.247
245. Id. at 1203 n.14 (citations omitted).
246. McGinley, supra note 144, at 1229.
247. See Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that transsexuals may bring sex discrimination claims under
Price Waterhouse for sex stereotyping); Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57680 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2007) (holding that a cause of action exists
for sex stereotyping of an MTF transsexual who wore nail polish and her hair in a feminine
way); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. 05-243, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6521 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (relying on Price Waterhouse in refusing to dismiss plaintiffs complaint that
alleged sexual harassment and discriminatory discharge because he was a transsexual); De-
piano v. Atlantic County, No. 02-5441, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20250 (D.NJ. Sept. 2, 2005)
(concluding that under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination a cause of action exists
for a cross-dresser who is harassed and discriminated against for failure to conform to gen-
der stereotypes); Sturchio v. Ridge, No. 03-0025-RHW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27345 (Dec.
20, 2004) (holding that plaintiff, an MTF transsexual who had undergone sex reassignment
surgery, had stated a cause of action for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII in her
complaint); Tronetti v. TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL
22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff, an MTF transsexual, had a
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In Glenn v. Brumby,248 the Northern District of Georgia denied a
motion to dismiss a case brought by a transgender individual pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and alleging that her firing was a
violation of the equal protection doctrine. The court held that the
allegation that the plaintiff began to dress as a woman during her
gender transition was sufficient to create a cause of action, espe-
cially because the defendant told her that people would think her
immoral if she dressed like a woman. In Schroer v. Billington,245 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia found il-
legal gender discrimination based on sex stereotyping, but also
broke with the earlier cases and found that the plain language of
the statute prohibits discrimination against transsexuals. In Schroer,
the court found that the plaintiff, an MTF transsexual, before un-
dergoing transition to a woman, had applied for a position of
Specialist in Terrorism and International Crime with the Congres-
sional Research Service.2 5 0 She was a highly-qualified candidate for
the position. She had graduated from the National War College
and the Army Command and General Staff College, had advanced
degrees and twenty-five years of service in the United States Armed
Forces, and a Special Operations Command, a job for which she
analyzed many classified operations and regularly briefed senior
military officials. 25' At the time of her application for the terrorism
specialist position, she had begun to work with a clinical social
worker to develop a plan for transitioning from male to female, a
transition that was guided by treatment protocols.
25 2
Schroer was interviewed for the job as a male and received the
highest score of all the interviewees .2 "After submitting additional
written materials, Schroer was selected unanimously by the com-
mittee for the position. She was offered the job and she accepted. 54
Before the paper work was completed, Schroer told Charlotte
Preece, a member of the selection committee staff, that she was
transgender and that she planned to transition from male to
cause of action for harassment because of sex under the stereotyping doctrine); Lie v. Sky
Publ'g Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (holding that
Massachusetts law prohibiting sex discrimination forbids employer from firing a transwoman
for refusing to wear men's clothes to work). But seeJohnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that the plaintiff had not made out a cause of action
because the defendant merely required her to use the men's room in light of her male
driver's license and did not react to her physical appearance).
248. 632 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
249. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
250. Id. at 295.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 296.
254. Id.
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female."" Preece, who seemed surprised and a bit alarmed, raised
issues about Schroer's security clearance."6 Schroer tried to reas-
sure her that there should be no security problem as Schroer had a
number of friends who had retained their clearances while transi-
tioning.5 7 Schroer showed Preece a number of photographs of
herself in women's attire. After speaking to a number of persons
in the office, but without calling Schroer to ask for more informa-
tion, Preece told Schroer that she was withdrawing the offer.
Schroer filed suit alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.
259
In a bench trial, the court concluded that the defendant had
discriminated against Schroer because of sex in violation of Title
VII.26 ° The court based its decision on two alternative theories.
First, it concluded that under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping
theory, the plaintiff proved that the defendant had violated Title
VII by refusing to hire her because of her failure to conform to the
sex stereotype of a man.261 The court noted that Preece testified
that when she looked at the photographs of the plaintiff dressed as
a woman, she looked like a man in women's clothing.262 Moreover,
Preece stated that she did not understand why the plaintiff would
become a woman, especially in light of her special operations train-
ing.26' The court inferred from Preece's statement that men with
special operations in their background are especially masculine
and it made Preece uncomfortable that the plaintiff did not live up
to the masculine image.64 Finally the court stated that it did not mat-
ter whether the defendant withdrew its offer of employment because
it perceived Schroer as an "insufficiently masculine man, an insuffi-
ciently feminine woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming
transsexual."2 65 The facts could be parsed to support any of these
three conclusions.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 297.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 299.
260. Id. at 300.
261. Id. at 305-06.
262. Id. at 305.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. State courts have followed the reasoning of Price Waterhouse to create a cause of
action under state statutes for transsexuals who do not conform to sex stereotypes. See, e.g.,
Lie v. Sky Publ'g Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002)
(holding that transsexuals are covered by the sex stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse);
Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding
that transsexual individual not covered by sexual orientation provision of the statute, but was
covered by prohibition of gender discrimination based on Price Waterhouse).
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Second, and perhaps more notable than the first conclusion be-
cause it departs from the other cases, Schroer concluded that under
the plain language of the statute the refusal to hire the plaintiff
occurred illegally "because of sex."2 6 The court disagreed with the
courts that have decided that Title VII does not forbid discrimina-
ion because of a person's transsexuality.261 Instead of looking at the
plain language of the statute, these courts improperly considered
the Congressional intent at the time that the statute was enacted. s
On its face, the statute simply forbids discrimination because of
sex. This language clearly forbids discrimination against a trans-
sexual because discrimination occurs because of the plaintiff's
sex.26 9 Furthermore, it did not trouble the court that Congress
would not have anticipated at the time of its passage that Title VII
would apply to discrimination against transsexuals because Title
VII has been interpreted numerous times in ways that go beyond
the intent of the enacting Congress. For example, in Oncale,
Justice Scalia noted that while same-sex harassment was not the
principal evil that Congress sought to condemn in Title VII, statu-
tory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil. 271 Finally, the
court questioned whether the decisions holding that Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" is limited to biologi-
cal or anatomical sex are still good law after Price Waterhouse. Even
if they are still good law, the court held that the defendant's refusal
to hire Schroer because she is changing her anatomy is literally
discrimination because of sex.272
ii. Problems and Limitations with Price Waterhouse
The cases of transsexuals alleging that their employers violated
Title VII by discriminating against them often hang by a thread
and, as in the sexual orientation cases, Price Waterhouse does not
always guarantee a fair result. In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority,
273
for example, the plaintiff, a pre-operative transwoman, began liv-
274ing as a woman in preparation for sex reassignment surgery.
266. 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07.
267. Id. at 307.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 308.
270. See id. at 307.
271. Id. at 307 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 423 U.S. 75, 79
(1998)).
272. Id. at 308.
273. 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
274. Id. at 1218.
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After successfully completing her training as a bus driver while
dressed as a man, she informed her supervisor that she would be-
gin to appear more female at work and that she would eventually
change her sex.275 The defendant fired the plaintiff because it was
concerned that while on the road Etsitty, who still had male genita-
lia, would use the women's restrooms, behavior that the employer
feared may lead to liability. 76 It stated on the record of her termi-
nation that the plaintiff would be eligible for rehire once she
completed the sex reassignment surgery. 77 The lower court
granted the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment.27s
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It con-
cluded, like other courts before it, that Title VII does not protect
transsexuals from discrimination based on their transsexuality.2 79
While recognizing that other courts have concluded that Price
Waterhouse creates a cause of action for transsexuals under Title VII
if the reason for the discrimination is the failure of the plaintiff to
conform to sexual stereotypes, the court refused to reach the ques-
tion of whether it would apply Price Waterhouse in a transsexual's
case. 80 It concluded that an employer has a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for firing an employee who has male genitals
and uses the women's bathroom. 28' The court rejected the plain-
tiffs argument that discriminating based on which bathroom she
planned to use was based on the sex stereotype that her behavior
should conform to the behavior of others who have male genita-
lia.282 The court concluded that the plaintiff's argument was merely
that the employer discriminated against her because of her status
283as a transsexual, a status that is not covered by the statute.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Price Waterhouse
does not reach so far as to protect from discrimination biological
284males with male genitalia who seek to use women's restrooms.
Finally, the court held that as a matter of law the plaintiff had not
proved that the reason proffered by the defendant was a pretext
for discrimination based on the plaintiffs failure to conform to sex
stereotypes. 28 5 Even though there was testimony in the record that
275. Id. at 1218-19.
276. Id. at 1219.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1220.
279. Id. at 1222.
280. Id. at 1223-24.
281. Id. at 1227.
282. Id. at 1226.
283. Id. at 1223-24.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1226.
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management fired Etsitty because it was concerned about its public
image, the court concluded that this testimony was insufficient to
send the case to the jury.
Even if we are to accept the court's reasoning about the reach of
Price Waterhouse, the court's conclusion that there was no genuine
issue of fact to go to the jury seems wrong. While a reasonable fact
finder could find, based on this evidence, that the defendant fired
Etsitty because she would have used the women's restroom, the
evidence is also sufficient to conclude that the defendant fired the
plaintiff at least in part because of its fear of a poor public image
based on Etsitty's appearance. Even if one were to conclude that
the employer had a legitimate concern about the restroom, there
was sufficient evidence that Etsitty's appearance or possible future
appearance, besides her restroom use, may have motivated her fir-
ing. Moreover, given the reality of the lives of transwomen, they will
not enjoy equal protection under the employment discrimination
laws until there is an accommodation to their restroom needs. I
discuss this issue more fully below.
Another limitation on the Price Waterhouse doctrine is a conclu-
sion that the defendant did not discriminate against the plaintiff
because of a failure to conform to sex stereotypes at work, but le-
gally discharged the plaintiff for behavior, such as cross-dressing,
outside of work. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.,286 for exam-
ple, the court rejected the plaintiffs stereotyping claim because
there was no evidence of harassment or discharge because of a lack
of masculinity at work; rather the evidence demonstrated that the
defendant fired the plaintiff because he assumed the role of a
woman outside of work. Oiler and similar decisions stress "behav-
ior" outside of work over an identity or presentation that fails to
conform to gender stereotypes. This interpretation also appears, as
mentioned above, in some of the cases in which the courts con-
clude that the discrimination occurred because of sexual
orientation defined as behavior outside of work, rather than an
effeminate presentation in the workplace.2 87 But masculinities re-
search makes the motivation for the discriminatory behavior clear.
Men at work are uncomfortable with other men who display femi-
nine or non-masculine characteristics, dress or behavior, whether
the display occurs at work or outside of work. This strong revulsion
is linked to the men's need to prove that they themselves are not
feminine and are therefore masculine. What better way to prove
286. No. 00-3114,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,2002).
287. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
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one's masculinity than to eliminate from the workplace those who
do not meet the society's masculine norms?
A third exception to using the Price Waterhouse doctrine to pro-
tect transgender individuals is the courts' willingness to allow
employers to enforce sex-specific dress codes. In Creed v. Family Ex-
press Corp., for example, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment of a claim brought for gender dis-
crimination by a transwoman. The employer averred that it fired
the plaintiff because she did not conform to the expectations of
the male worker, as specified by the employer's dress code. When
asked why she was fired, the employer asked her "if it would kill
[her] to appear masculine for eight hours a day," and "why she ap-
plied for the job if she knew she would be undergoing a gender
transition."2 9 These statements appear to be direct evidence of dis-
crimination based on the plaintiffs gender, but the court
concluded that the employer had the right to dictate to the plain-
tiff that she dress like a man in conformity with its dress code. 90
The new ENDA may solve this problem, because it permits an em-
ployer to impose a sex-specific dress code on transgender
individuals, but it would require the employer to permit the em-
ployee to abide by the dress code of the gender to which the
employee is transitioning. 9 1 Hopefully, courts will not define "tran-
sition" narrowly or require extraordinary notice of the transition to
the employer. And, if ENDA passes without this provision, it will
deny important protection to transgender individuals.
iii. Restrooms and Reasonable Accommodation
As Etsitty demonstrates, for the transsexual cases, there is an-
other issue in play that goes beyond those in the sexual orientation
cases. In a number of the cases, the defendants have successfully
defended by arguing that they did not discriminate against MTF
transsexuals when they refused to allow transwomen workers to use
291the women's restroom. - In Etsitty, for example, the employer de-
fended by stating that it fired the employee or refused to rehire
her because of the concern that other women using public rest-
288. No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237 (N.D. Ind.Jan. 5, 2009).
289. Id. at *9.
290. Id. at*10.
291. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 8(a)(5) (2009); S. 1584,1 l1th Cong. § 8(a)(5) (2009).
292. A 2008 survey of transsexuals in California found that 12 percent were denied ac-
cess to appropriate restrooms and 11 percent were denied access to restrooms that matched
their gender identity. HARTZELL, supra note 202, at 10.
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rooms along the employee's route would be uncomfortable with a
pre-operative MTF transsexual with male genitalia using the
women's restroom.' 9' In Goins v. West Group,294 the defendant
threatened to discipline Goins because she insisted on using the
women's restroom near her work station.29 Coins, a transwoman
who had not had reconstructive surgery, was told to use a single
restroom in another part of the facility.296 When the employer
threatened discipline, she quit and sued for discrimination under
the Minnesota Human Rights Law, which banned discrimination
based on gender identity and gender self-image.2 7 Despite the ex-
plicit language protecting against discrimination based on gender
identity, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defendant
had the right to insist that employees use the restroom in accor-
dance with their biological sex, and that such a requirement did
not constitute illegal discrimination against the plaintiff.29
Etsitty and Goins present the problems encountered by many
transsexuals, especially the MTF transsexuals, who suffer discrimi-
nation in the workplace. In Etsitty, it was difficult to prove that the
discrimination occurred because of the individual's failure to live
up to gender stereotypes. Goins demonstrates that even where
there is specific protection in the statute, the restroom issue raises
issues for the courts. In Goins, despite the statutory protection of
gender identity and self-image, the court still refused to require the
employer to permit the plaintiff, who still had male genitals, to use
the women's restroom.
These cases demonstrate a surprising lack of interest in or un-
derstanding of the lived reality of transwomen. The hard fact is
that the years of transition from male to female gender are
293. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Kastl v.
Maricopa County Cmty. Coll., 325 F. App'x 492 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding grant of sum-
mary judgment to the defendant where it declined to rehire plaintiff, a MTF transgender
individual, due to her use of the women's restroom). Some employers may argue that they
will not offer the opportunity for a pre-operative MTF transsexual to use the women's rest-
room because they fear suit by another woman. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219. This fear is likely
groundless. In fact, in Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. #1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002), the
court ruled that the defendant did not create a hostile work environment for a woman em-
ployee when it permitted a MTF transsexual who still had male genitalia to use the women's
restroom because the MTF transsexual merely used the restroom and did not engage in
misconduct.
294. 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
295. Id. at 721.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 721-22.
298. Id. at 723. An Ohio court came to the same conclusion in Johnson v. Fresh Mark
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003), which held that the plaintiff had not made out a
cause of action because the defendant merely required her to use the men's room in light of
her male driver's license and did not react to her physical appearance.
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extremely dangerous for transwomen. This is because the likeli-
hood of violent attack from men who find them threatening or
repulsive is highest at this time. A transsexual MTF needs to avoid
using the men's restroom because it is dangerous to use the men's
room. 299 This is consistent with the masculinities literature. It posits
that the transwoman, like the gay man, is an affront to the mascu-
linity of the other men in the restroom. The transwoman openly
displays feminine dress and traits that are threatening to men who
need to differentiate themselves from women in order to prove
their masculinity. Often this confrontation results in violence
against the gender non-conforming male. Women who may be ex-
pected to share the women's restroom react negatively to the
transwoman's use of the women's room because they are con-
cerned that the transsexual who still has male genitalia will attack
or rape them in the restroom. But the bathroom problem should
not create needless difficulties for employers. Nor should it create
an excuse for failure to hire or for discharging an employee.
Under Title VII law, an argument could be made that a policy
requiring transsexuals who are in transition to use the restroom
that accords with their biological sex and their genitals has a dispa-
rate effect on men because of the dangers of an MTF's use of the
men's restroom far exceeds the dangers that an FTM encounters
using the women's restroom. With proper documentation of the
dangers encountered by MTF transsexuals, some courts might
agree that a Title VII case exists if this proof is available because
transwomen as a group would be disadvantaged in comparison
with transmen as a group. But disparate impact litigation is difficult
and the courts may be unwilling to accept evidence that MTF
transsexuals in general encounter dangers in male restrooms.
Courts may insist on statistical evidence of dangers in the particular
workplace, evidence that would likely be unavailable or at least in-
sufficient to prove a statistical disparate impact case. Furthermore,
even if the new ENDA passes, there may be continuing difficulty
for transgender individuals who seek to use the restrooms of their
gender expressed identity because ENDA does not create a cause
of action for disparate impact. And, although ENDA requires an
employer to reasonably accommodate a person based on gender
identity if the employer seeks an exemption where there are
299. See DEIRDRE MCCLOSKEY, CROSSING: A MEMOIR 38-39 (1999).
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shared locker facilities, it is unclear whether this requirement ap-
plies to restroom facilities.00
One practical solution to the restroom problem would be to re-
quire a reasonable accommodation to the transgender person.
One accommodation for an employer who compels the trans-
woman worker to use the men's room would require the employer
to guarantee her safety from physical harm and sexual harassment.
But even this response is not satisfactory because the transwoman is
living as a woman and views herself as a woman. Forcing a woman
to use the men's restroom even in the absence of physical danger
seems an inappropriate affront to personal dignity, and is perhaps
psychologically harmful. The better solution would be employer
education of its female employees that would dispel their discom-
fort with sharing the restroom with a female person with male
genitals. If education is insufficient to make the women comfort-
able, the employer should be required to make a reasonable
accommodation to the bathroom needs of the individual. The
courts have interpreted Title VII to require reasonable accommo-
dation in religious discrimination cases.0 1 Such a requirement
need not be onerous. Goins demonstrates that permitting the
transsexual employee to use an individual bathroom if one exists in
the workplace is one option that may not be welcome to the trans-
sexual employee. Nonetheless some transsexual employees may be
302
comfortable with this option:
In evaluating the effectiveness of a reasonable accommodation,
it is important to recognize that many transgendered individuals
do not have sex reassignment surgery, either because they lack the
resources to pay for the surgery or because they choose not to have
the surgery for other reasons. It is more common for transwomen
than transmen to have surgery for three reasons. First, transwomen
have difficulty passing as women if the transition takes place after
puberty because it is nearly impossible to reverse the effects of the
male hormones. Even after taking female hormones, transwomen
continue to grow beards.03 Moreover, taking female hormones
does not reduce foot size or height, so often transwomen are larger
300. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 1584 Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 1IIth Cong. (2009) (statement of Camille A. Olson,
Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP).
301. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
302. Experts in the area recommend that one's use of restrooms should follow the per-
son's full time gender presentation. One should never be required to use the restroom of
one's birth once the person has begun transitioning from one sex to another. See HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, TRANSGENDER INCLUSION IN THE WORKPLACE 33 (2d ed. 2008).
303. See GRIGGS, supra note 2, at 37 (explaining the need for MTF transsexuals for elec-
trolysis to remove facial hair).
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than women are typically. Many transwomen constantly fear that
they will not pass as women. °4 This situation contrasts with that of
transmen who after only a few months have little trouble passing as
men.3 05 Because of this differential, there is more incentive for
transwomen than transmen to have gender reassignment surgery
in order to accomplish a more authentic transition.00
Second, and perhaps even more important, sex reassignment
surgery is more successful for transwomen than for transmen.
While surgeons can create a vagina by means of vaginoplasty that
would fool gynecologists into believing it is natural from birth, the
results of phalloplasty-surgery creating a penis-are less authen-
tic, especially because the functioning of the new penis is not
ideal.307 Finally, phalloplasty is much more expensive than vagino-
plasty, approximately three or four times more expensive: Many
transmen, therefore, opt to have breast surgery and to take male
hormones, but not to have phalloplasty. While the clitoris grows
from the male hormones and becomes erect upon stimulation, it
does not appear as a penis, but it does allow for orgasm. Many FTM
transmen wear artificial penises so that they appear to be men
through their clothes.
These facts are important in considering the employer's reac-
tions to a transgender employee's request to use the restroom
consistent with gender identity and expression. An employer like
Utah Transit Authority that conditions Etsitty's rehiring and use of
the women's restroom on proof that the plaintiff has completed
sex reassignment surgery will needlessly treat some transgender
individuals who have had sex reassignment surgery better than
those who have either not yet finished the transition or who have
chosen to forego surgery altogether. While employers may argue
that this distinction is legitimate because their policy is to attribute
gender based on the individual's genitalia, these policies do not
comport with the world of transgender persons whose doctors ad-
vise them to wait for surgery until after they have lived as the sex to
which they are transitioning for at least a year. Nor do they respect
the legitimate decisions of transgender individuals who change
their attributed gender, but fail to undergo sex reassignment sur-
gery. Distinguishing among these individuals, granting benefits to
304. Id. at 81.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 81-86.
307. Id. at 82, 89; Schilt, supra note 189, at 57.
308. GRIGGS, supra note 2, at 83.
309. Id. at 86-87.
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some but not to others, clearly is discrimination based on sex and
gender.
There is an interesting tension between the social construction
of gender espoused by masculinities and feminist theory and the
lived experience of many transsexuals. In some ways, transsexuals'
experiences support the masculinities and feminist theorists' views
that gender and sex are not fixed phenomena. Many transsexuals
consciously perform gender in a way that evokes the other sex,
dressing bodies with male anatomy with exaggerated feminine
dress such as makeup and dresses, or binding one's female breasts
so as to pass as males. Many transsexuals, however, view the solu-
tion to their problems as a permanent transition to the other sex.
Some transsexuals tell compelling tales about their gender identity.
They do not see their transitions as a choice, but as a coming out
of the closet to reveal their true identities.1 ° If the transsexual be-
lieves ardently, as many do, that she or he inhabits the wrong body,
and ingests hormones and has surgery to effect a sex change, it ap-
pears that the transsexual believes that biology determines sex and
gender. By concluding that they do not fit into the bodies into
which they were born, transgender individuals who live as trans-
sexuals reinforce the idea that there are only two genders.
The story is, however, more complicated. As noted above, there is
considerable variation among transgender individuals concerning
how they transition. Some take hormones and go through sex reas-
signment surgery as well as other surgeries to make less visible
secondary sex characteristics. Others, as mentioned above, may have
hormone therapy and live in a transitioned gender, but opt not to
have sex reassignment surgery. Furthermore, even when trans-
gender individuals opt for sex reassignment surgery, the physical
transition is only part of the story. Besides the physical changes ac-
complished through electrolysis, hormones, and surgery, acquiring a
true identity involves significant performative changes, and trans-
sexuals are keenly aware of the need to perform their newly adopted
gender. Transwomen are particularly conscious about gender per-
formances because they have more difficulty passing as women than
transmen have passing as men. Kristen Schilt notes that there is a
differential in the amount of scrutiny women suffer.1 In addition to
the physical differences in passing, it is likely that the additional
scrutiny of women's appearances creates more problems for men
who are transitioning to women.
310. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 299 (stating throughout that she was not making a de-
cision to change but she was expressing her identity).
311. See SCHILT, supra note 189, at 225.
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When transitioning, many transwomen consciously adopt female
mannerisms, methods of speech, and ways of developing relation-
ships. Deirdre McClosky, a transwoman economics professor at the
University of Iowa, for example, explains in her memoir that she
studied how women performed their gender-how they helped
one another, their speech patterns, and their willingness not to be
the center of attention in group discussions-and she worked to
emulate women's styles.12 She also observes that there were differ-
ences between the way women relate to one another in American
and Dutch cultures.13 She observes that many transwomen re-
ceived coaching from a speech therapist. She believes that it is
necessary not only because women's voices are higher in tone but
also because women speak differently from men. She opines that
women use fewer and less expressive gestures with their hands and
keep their hands closer to the body when they speak. She notes
that women speak with more modulation, but also more softly and
often end phrases or sentences with an upward lilt. Another trans-
woman posits that women use more facial expressions when they
speak, smile more frequently and look more directly into another's
eyes when they speak.31 4 Transmen must be aware of similar issues,
but Schilt's research demonstrates that transmen experience more
acceptance from their male colleagues when openly transitioning
than transwomen do. Because the transmen adopt male gender
role or expression, they present as masculine and less threatening
to the masculinity of their male coworkers. Because masculine
women are less threatening than feminine men, transmen have
often adopted masculine dress, appearance and behaviors even
before making the transition.
Transwomen's lives demonstrate that the feminine gender ex-
pressions do not automatically follow physical and hormonal
changes because they are social, not biological, in origin. Thus,
although transsexuals tend to reinforce the concept of the binary
of two sexes, transsexuals' lived reality is that the physical changes
are only a minor part of their transition. Furthermore, the trans-
gender community consists of a diversity of gender and sexual
expressions that is not limited to the binary definitions of male and
female, masculine and feminine. There is the post-modern con-
312. McCLoSKY, supra note 299, at 33, 77, 82, 83, 155-56, 159-60, 209-10, 264.
313. Id. at 142-43, 171-73.
314. GRIGGS, supra note 2, at 9.
315. Schilt, supra note 189, at 121.
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cept of transsexuals as living "outside the boundaries of gender"
rather than conforming with a particular or "opposite" gender" 6
This idea points to the position of trans people as located
somewhere outside the spaces customarily offered to men and
women, as people who are beyond the laws of gender. So the
assumption that there are only two (opposite) genders, with
their corresponding "masculinities" and "femininities," is
opened up to scrutiny. Instead, it is suggested that there is a
possibility of a "third" space outside the gender dichotomy.
This idea refers not simply to the addition of another cate-
gory; it is conceived as "a space for society to articulate and
make sense of all its various gendered identities."
3 17
4. Protecting Intersex Individuals
Intersex or development sex disorder (DSD) individuals consti-
tute another category of persons whose status under Title VII is
ambiguous. To date, there are no reported cases brought by intersex
individuals, but if they suffer discrimination as a result of their sex-
ual ambiguity, intersex individuals should have a cause of action
under Title VII. Discrimination against intersex individuals because
of their ambiguous genitalia or conflict between genitalia and
chromosomes would appear to be prohibited by Title VII's clear
language that bans discrimination because of the individual's sex.
But as we have seen, courts have made distinctions between sex
stereotyping and sexual orientation and between sex stereotyping
and gender identity discrimination. It is not inconceivable that they
would draw boundaries between sex discrimination and
discrimination because a person is intersex. Such line drawing in the
case of an intersex person would contradict the clear language of
the statute that prohibits discrimination because of sex. Although
intersex persons may not necessarily be categorized as male or fe-
male, they do have a sex. And even if courts conclude that they are
not protected under the clear language of Title VII, it is possible
that Price Waterhouse may be used to protect intersex individuals from
discrimination. But it is also possible that intersex individuals would
316. Richard Ekins & Dave King, Transgendering, Men, and Masculinities, in HANDBOOK
OF STUDIES ON MEN AND MASCULINITIES 379, 389 (Michael S. Kimmel et al. eds., 2005)
(citing Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, in BODY GUARDS: THE
CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 280 (Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds.,
1991)).
317. Id. (citing ZACHARY I. NATAF, LESBIANS TALK TRANSGENDER 57 (1996)).
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fall into the gap and not receive protection of the sex stereotyping
doctrine. Another possibility open to intersex individuals but not to
transgender persons is protection under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act against workplace discrimination. While the ADA
expressly excludes transgender persons from the definition of dis-
..... 318
ability, it makes no exclusion for intersex individuals.
IV. MASCULINITIES: IMPROVING THEORY AND
RESULTS IN TITLE VII CASES
Masculinities theory teaches us that men as a group prove their
masculinity and police the masculinity of the job by engaging in
discriminatory behavior toward men who do not live up to mascu-
line norms. It may be that femininity or perceived femininity of gay
or transgendered individuals causes the abusive behavior they of-
ten suffer at work.
Masculinities studies demonstrate that the very methods used to
harass non-conforming men are based on the superiority of men
over women, the masculine over the feminine.31 9 If permitted by
law, the conflation of certain types of work with men, and men with
hegemonic masculinities, privileges gender-conforming men over
women and gender non-conforming men. It also privileges white
middle-class men over men of color. It leads to environments that
are abusive to women and gender non-conforming men because of
their sex, and it creates a whole class of jobs that exclude all but
the most daring women and gender non-conforming men. By not
recognizing that this behavior discriminates because of a person's
sex, in violation of Title VII, courts reinforce the hegemonic mas-
culinities, the superiority of masculine men and the inferiority of
women, and the gender differences in pay and experience. Dis-
criminatory behaviors, if permitted to continue, confirm that
women (and non-conforming men) do not belong in many work-
places that are predominately male. Without desegregating these
workplaces and breaking down the gender identification of the
jobs in question, it is virtually impossible to achieve equality for
women, many men, and sexual minorities.
Masculinities research, along with identity performance theory,
may help the courts see that discrimination based on homosexual-
ity or bisexuality is discrimination because of gender and is
318. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12211(b)(1) (2006).
319. See Case, supra note 118, at 18, 33, 47 (noting that many cases interpret Price Water-
house not to apply to the feminine male and arguing that this dev-aluation of the feminine
harms not only the individual effeminate male, but also women as a group).
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therefore prohibited by Title VII. Masculinities research eschews
the binary of feminine and masculine/heterosexuality and homo-
sexuality as harmful to those who do not fit into one or the other
extremes. Identity performance theory explains that, in the work-
place, outsiders, such as gays, lesbians and bisexuals, have to
perform their identities in order to gain acceptance at work .
These performances take a toll on the individual because they en-
tail significant extra work, and include negotiations with the self
about what performances are acceptable. These are precisely the
type of workplace pressures Title VII was meant to dismantle.
Likewise, the transgender cases raise significant issues concern-
ing masculinity. First, it is notable that all of the reported decisions
on transsexuals deal with transwomen. Moreover, many of the deci-
sions involve MTF transsexuals who work in jobs that have a male
gender identity: bus driver, firefighter, police officer, terrorism spe-
cialist. All of these jobs, especially those of police officer, firefighter
and terrorism specialist, are perceived as requiring masculine
characteristics. In light of Schilt and Wiswall's research demonstrat-
ing that transwomen experience serious pay disadvantage as well as
less acceptance in their transitions than their transmen counter-
parts, masculinities research is especially relevant to understanding
discrimination against transsexuals. Masculinities scholars note
that men in jobs that are predominately male experience a need to
prove their masculinity to other men. They construct their mascu-
line identities through interaction with other persons in the
workplace. In the transsexual cases, the male workers' behavior
toward the transsexual plaintiffs protects the job from devaluation
due to an association with femininity, and helps the male employ-
ees to construct their masculinity at work. These behaviors, we have
seen, also occur in sexual harassment cases where the plaintiff is
either homosexual or a man who does not otherwise live up to the
norms of masculinity.
Transwomen may be even more threatening to the masculinity
of the male workers than women or gays in the workplace. Any
man who would reject his masculinity to the extreme of taking
hormones or having his male organs surgically removed may be
perceived as a serious danger to masculinity. Because masculinity is
defined as that which is not feminine, a decision to purposefully
express oneself as feminine is anathema to male coworkers who
need to prove their masculinity to one another. Female coworkers,
too, may further the discrimination by insisting on complementary
definitions of male and female, and refusing to accept transwomen
320. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 55.
SPRING 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
in the women's restrooms. In this way, masculinity research helps
courts understand how discrimination against sexual minorities
occurs not only because of sexual orientation or transgender
status, but also "because of sex."
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual minorities deserve protection under Title VII. To date,
that protection is elusive and fragmented. Although many courts
recognize a cause of action under Price Waterhouse for discrimina-
tion based on a person's failure to conform to gender stereotypes,
Title VII has been uniformly interpreted not to prohibit discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation and, except for one case, not to
prohibit discrimination based on transgender identity. The distinc-
tion between prohibited discrimination based on gender
stereotypes and permissible discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation has created judicial attempts at line-drawing to establish the
motivations of perpetrators. Similar line-drawing occurs in trans-
gender cases when courts attempt to decide whether the employer
was motivated by the plaintiff's transgender status or her failure to
conform to gender stereotypes.
Masculinities theory demonstrates that distinguishing between
these two sets of motivations is inadvisable and impossible. When
combined with Schilt's empirical work, masculinities theory can help
explain why the vast majority of the sexual orientation cases are
brought by men in traditionally male workplaces and all of the
transgender cases are brought by transwomen. In both cases, the
harassment or other discriminatory behavior occurs because the
plaintiff, who is identified by the perpetrators as a man, threatens
the definition and concept of masculinity. Homosexual orientation
is associated with femininity, an inferior gender status. Male-to-
female transgenderism may be even more threatening than homo-
sexuality because it rejects the superiority of masculinity in the most
graphic of terms. The transgender individual dresses and behaves
like a woman, and may even have reconstructive surgery to remove
his male sexual organs. In this way, masculinities theory explains
how discrimination against sexual minorities is inherently "because
of sex" and therefore prohibited by Tide VII.
Passage of ENDA, especially if it includes protection for gender
identity and accommodation to the needs of transgender individu-
als, would ameliorate some of the problems because courts should
not engage in the boundary-drawing between the defendant's mo-
tivations for the discriminatory behavior. ENDA, however, may
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create more line-drawing problems. For example, judges may be
uncomfortable concluding that discrimination against an individ-
ual because of her engagement outside of work in varying sexual
behaviors is discrimination based on bisexuality. Judges may also
impose a narrow definition of those who are covered by the rest-
room accommodation in the statute by interpreting "transition"
narrowly or by imposing unreasonable notice requirements on the
employees. Even more problematic, judges could potentially con-
clude that there is no "transition" without sex reassignment
surgery.
Intersex individuals face similar hurdles under Title Vii. While it
makes sense that discrimination against a person because she is
intersex or has a development sex disorder (DSD) violates Title VII
because the discrimination would occur because of the sex of the
individual, it is unclear whether courts will conclude that the stat-
ute forbids discrimination based on DSD. While discrimination
based on DSD may also be prohibited by the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA), judges interpreting Title VII and the ADA may
see DSD as the same as sexual orientation or gender identity dis-
crimination, or may conclude that because the individual was born
as "third sex," the discrimination against the individual does not
occur because of sex. While this conclusion makes little sense, we
have already seen the courts attempting to draw fine lines between
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender non-
conformity and concluding that discrimination based on trans-
gender status is not protected by Title VII. It is not a far step to the
conclusion that discrimination based on intersex status is not the
type of discrimination that the authors of Title VII sought to con-
demn, and, therefore, discrimination based on intersex status is
not prohibited by the statute.
An amendment to Title VII or passage of ENDA to protect
against discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity
and intersex conditions would further the interests of LGBTI
individuals. Nonetheless, passage of an amendment or a new act
may not resolve the problems raised by the line-drawing debate
over sex stereotyping and sexual orientation discrimination. Courts
may continue to draw lines, this time between discrimination based
on bisexuality and discrimination based on behavior outside of the
workplace, and between discrimination based on transgender
identity and based on an employee's failure to use the proper rest-
room.
Even in the absence of statutory amendment or a new statute,
Title VII should protect against discrimination based on sexual
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orientation, intersex conditions and gender identity and should
provide reasonable accommodation, where necessary, to allow sex-
ual minorities to live and work with dignity and security.
Masculinities research such as the theoretical work of R.C. Connell
and Michael Kimmel and the qualitative empirical work of Kristen
Schilt will advance the understanding of the victims of discrimina-
tion and of the causes of discriminatory behaviors, which are often
rooted in a need to prove masculinity. With an understanding of
sexual minorities and the reasons why discrimination occurs, Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" should be suf-
ficient, if interpreted broadly, to grant sexual minorities workplace
rights.
